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QUESTIONS- PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(1) Did the Utah Court of Appeals err i n: 
(a) Holding that it is "not possible" to construe the 
' Whist I H Blowoi A.L, t hcu muii ious ! y v.  :i the civil Service 
statutes; and 
(b) Holding that a Civi 1 Service employee, who claims 
that 1 i :i s puM n i-finpluyer wrongful l:y terminated h 1 s 
employment, can, simply by alleging that he was discharged 
because of "whistle blower" activities, circumvent the Civil 
Service statutes? 
2• W:\ 1 public policy, as established by the State 
Lei.J \ cr ..:t~.L ,:,v.^--^rP ; ; . -. . ,- ••,; . "' ; -^T r ^ T PI'1 ' 
ruling that a terminated Civil Service employee may ignore, 
circumvent, by-pass and • • n*- nternal administrative 
erroneous personnel decisions before judicial intervention a* 
mitigate damages to the employee, the employer and the public by 
ordering reinstatement? 
(3) Did the Court of Appeals err in failing to address 
Appe] ] ant' s non-comp] i ance wi tl I RII ] e 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure? 
REFERENCE TO THE OPINION ISSUED 
BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals opinion,1 issued on March 17, 1992, is 
. ^atton-Ward v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 182 Utah Ad\ 
Rep. 44 (Utah App. 1992). . '. 
set forth in Appendix "A'U The opinion of the District Court,2 
dated February 23, 1990, is attached as Appendix "B". 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has discretionary jurisdiction of this case, 
pursuant to §78-2-2(5) of the Utah Code Ann, and Rule 46 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Petitioner is seeking 
review of a decision issued by the Court of Appeals on March 17, 
1992 for the following reasons: 
1. The Court of Appeals decided important questions of 
municipal and state law which have not been, but should be 
settled by this Court; and 
2. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of state law 
in a way that is in conflict with decisions rendered by this 
Court. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF 
THE RELEVANT STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
Copies of the following statutes and rules are attached: 
1. §§10-3-1001 et seq. of the Utah Code Ann.3 
2. §§67-21-1 et seq. of the Utah Code Ann.4 
3. §§67-19-30 - 67-19-31, §§67-19a-201 et seg;. , §§17-30-1 
et seq., §§17-28-1 et seq., §§17-31-1 et seq. of the Utah Code 
Ann.5 
2R. at 173-182. 
3Appendix "C". 
AAppendix MDM. 
5Appendix "E". 
2 
4, § 3 0 -1. -9)2 , § 10- 3-1106 of the Utah Code Ann. and Rules 7 -
6-1 through 7-6-6 oi the Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission 
Rules and Regulations.6 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
• Appellant Hatton-Ward, hereinafter referred to as "Hattun-
Ward", filed a complain: ; District Court alleging that 
Petitioner-Appe, .*-..- - ••--••. ...--....-' •-?•;: 
referred to as the "City", wrongfully terminated h-s employment 
in reprisal for his alleged "whistle blower" activities.7 The 
District Court dismissed Hatton-Ward'" s w rongfu] terini i lati • : i c: ase, 
without prejudice, ruling that: 
HIM Whist)*1 BIUW<..M" statute does not replace and 
nullify the Civil Service statutes. Both statutes must be 
construed together,8 
When thij C i \> in I S+trvire Commission nears appeals or 
wrongful discharge, it must consider whether or not the 
termination oi the employee was legally wrongful for any reason, 
including a violation ot the Whistle bluwer" Act, II ' )«it-
construction of the statutes was not followed, a terminated 
employee couM by-»pasi*. the remedial scheme established in the 
Civil Service statutes by merely alleging that the employee was 
terminated for "whistle blower" activities.9 
6Appendix "F" 
;Hatton-Ward, supra a f 4 4. 
8R. at 17 7, 
[iR a i II" ' / 
3 
4. Since Hatton-Ward did not appeal to the Civil Service 
Commission before filing his action in the District Court, he has 
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 
On March 17, 1992, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
decision of the District Court holding that: 
(1) It is not possible to "harmonize" the Whistle 
Blower Act with the Civil Service statutes.10 
(2) In a wrongful termination case involving a Civil 
Service employee who alleges that his dismissal was in 
reprisal for "whistle blower" activities, the Civil Service 
Commission serves no useful purpose and, therefore, the 
terminated employee can Ignore and by-pass the statutory 
administrative process.11 The District Court has exclusive 
jurisdiction nullifying the jurisdiction of the Civil 
Service Commission.12 Further, in such case, a Civil 
Service employee may elect not to seek reinstatement and 
pursue his remedies directly to District Court.13 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following is a statement of the undisputed facts 
relevant to this case: 
1. As required by law, the City has a classified Civil 
Service which includes all police officers in the City's Police 
10Hatton-Ward, supra at 46. 
uHatton-Ward, supra at 45. 
12
 Id. 
13Id. 
4 
Depar tment 14 
2, Batton-Ward was employed as a POJLCH oftleei by ihe 
City.15 
3 Ah inquired by law,,, II'IP- C.\\"\ s civil service system has 
a Civil Service Commission whose members are appointed by t\hr-
Mayor and confirmed by zhe City Council. •" 
4, "All persons in tn* .•.-.- . - <,--*-v.-*- ma,} be 
removed from office or employment by the head cr ih^ department 
foi niiscondur• , incompetency or failure in perform hi:- duties or 
failure to observe properly the rules of the Department, subject 
to appeal by the discharged person to the Civil Service 
Commission. "i? 
5, .Any discharged Civil Service employee may appeal to the 
Civil service Commission, which shall fully hear and determine 
the matter,18 
6, On or about October 30, 1989, the Chief of the City -. 
Police Department te.irinuiatied Hatton-Ward's employment stating as 
reasons; insubordination, neglect of duties, in i scnnckie t , 
incompetency, failure to perform his duties and fa ilure to 
properly obser v e t! • ot tlie department.19 
14§] 0-3-J 002 of the Utah Code Ai in, R. at 31. 
lbR„ at 331. 
16S§10-3- 1003 and 10-3-1004 of the Utah Code Ann. 
l7S10-J-lUia ot the Utah Code Ann, 
.
l8S10-3-1012 of the Utah Code Ann. 
19R, dt 32-?3 7 5-R9. 
5 
7. In the termination letter, the Chief of Police advised 
Hatton-Ward that he could appeal the discharge to the Civil 
Service Commission, in writing, within 10 calendar days from 
receipt of the termination letter.20 
8. On November 16, 1989, Hatton-Ward served the City with a 
complaint filed in the District Court21 alleging that the City 
violated §§67-21-1 et seer, of the Utah Code Ann, (the Whistle 
Blower Statute) by terminating his employment because of his 
alleged whistle blower activities.22 
9. Hatton-Ward did not appeal his discharge to the Civil 
Service Commission before he filed a complaint in the District 
Court.23 
10. On February 23, 1990, the District Court, Judge Leonard 
Russon presiding, dismissed Hatton-Ward's complaint, without 
prejudice, because he failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies .2A 
11. On March 17, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals, Regnal W. 
Garff, Norman H. Jackson and Gregory K. Orme, presiding, reversed 
the decision of the District Court.25 
20R. at 33, 75-89. 
21R. at 23-25, 33. 
22R. at 13-14, 33-35. 
23R. at 35, 91. 
2AR. at 173-182. 
25Hatton-Ward, supra. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED IMPORTANT 
QUESTIONS OF MUNICIPAL AND STATE LAW WHICH 
HAVE NOT BEEN, BUT SHOULD BE SETTLED, BY THIS 
COURT. 
A. The decision of the Court of Appeals will deprive 
State, County and Municipal employers of the 
opportunity given to them by statute to work out their 
personnel problems within an administrative framework. 
This is the first case involving the interpretation of the 
Utah "Whistle Blower" statute. Since each statute is a component 
of an entire body of statutes, the interpretation relates not 
only to the "Whistle Blower" Act, but also to existing statutes 
which specifically provide to the public employers the 
opportunity, through an extensive remedial administrative 
grievance process, to review and correct personnel decisions made 
by its managers.26 
According to the Court of Appeals, career service public 
employees, who claim that they were wrongfully discharged, may 
circumvent and by-pass the remedial scheme established in State 
law, simply by alleging that their dismissal was in reprisal for 
"whistle blower" activities.27 Consequently, the statutory 
process established to redress personnel grievances of Civil 
Service employees will be nullified by "artful pleading". 
26§§67-19-30 - 67-19-31, 67-19a-201 et se&. of the Utah Code 
Ann., §§17-30-1 et seg. of the Utah Code Ann., §§17-28-1 et seg. 
of the Utah Code Ann., §§17-31-1 et seg. of the Utah Code Ann., 
§10-3-1106 of the Utah Code Ann., §§10-3-1001 et seg,. of the Utah 
Code Ann. 
27Hatton-Ward, supra at 45-46. 
7 
The Court of Appeals^ decision disregards the burdens of 
managing the government's work force by elected officials. 
State, county and municipal governments have thousands of 
employees under the supervision of various managers. In 
addition, most public employees are career service and, by law, 
can be terminated only for cause.28 
The responsibility for the operation of the government, 
including its employees, rests with those who are elected by and 
responsible to the public.29 Since personnel decisions are 
being made daily by government supervisors, an elected official 
cannot be involved in each decision, particularly dismissals for 
cause. 
Utah law, however, provides for administrative review of 
termination decisions by boards and commissions appointed by the 
elected officials.30 Through the administrative grievance 
process, those responsible for operating the government have the 
opportunity to discover, mitigate and cure erroneous personnel 
actions, without judicial intervention.31 The administrative 
28See e.g. §10-3-1012 of the Utah Code Ann. 
29Gord v. Salt Lake City, 434 P.2d 449 (Utah 1967). 
30The Mayor, with consent of the City Council, appoints the 
Civil Service Commission (§10-3-1003 of the Utah Code Ann.): the 
Governor, with consent of the Senate, appoints the Career Service 
Review Board (§67-19a-201 of the Utah Code Ann.); the County 
Commission appoints the Deputy Sheriff Merit Commission (§17-30-3 
of the Utah Code Ann.); the Firemen's Civil Service Commission, 
(§17-28-1 of the Utah Code Ann.) and the Career Service Council 
(§17-33-4); the Mayor appoints members to the Employees Appeals 
Board (§10-3-1006 of the Utah Code Annl. 
31McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195 (1969). 
8 
process could find-that an employee's rights were violated by a 
government supervisor. In such a case, the employee would be 
reinstated and damages for back wages, the cost of protracted 
litigation and other harm related to the employee's wrongful 
absence from the job would be mitigated for the public, the 
government employer and employee. 
The remedial process would ensure consistency, to the extent 
possible, in applying discipline to government employees and give 
the elected officials control over the management of government 
personnel.32 
The Court of Appeals decision deprives the government and 
its elected officials of the opportunity, provided by statute, to 
review and correct erroneous personnel decisions of subordinate 
managers. Since there is no prior determination of the merits of 
a whistle blower claim, government employees can easily 
circumvent and nullify the legislatively mandated administrative 
process since most adverse personnel actions can include 
allegations of "whistle blower" activities. 
Further, according to the Court of Appeals, a Civil Service 
employee is not required to pursue reinstatement in a wrongful 
termination action. If terminated career service employees are 
not required to first seek reinstatement, the Court of Appeals 
effectively has written the Civil Service and other 
administrative review statutes out of the Utah Code. 
Before the statutory administrative process is dismantled, 
32Gord, supra. 
9 
this Court should review the reasoning of the Court of Appeals to 
reconsider whether the courts should assume the responsibility of 
managing the government's personnel grievances. 
B. In interpreting the "Whistle Blower" statute, the Court 
of Appeals failed to consider important underlying 
policies. 
Although there are no Utah cases regarding whistle blower 
laws, decisions in other jurisdictions provide insight into 
policy considerations which pertain to whistle blower 
legislation.33 
The Court of Appeals determined that the Whistle Blower 
statute provides a "private reward" for a public employee who 
reports government waste. Whistle blowers, therefore, are 
motivated by personal monetary gain.34 
Courts in other jurisdictions, however, have held that 
whistle blowers should be motivated, in part, by a desire to 
inform the public about violations of laws and statutes, as a 
service to the public. The protections should not be used as a 
personal shield from legitimate discipline, or for retaliation 
against supervisors, or for the receiving of personal monetary 
35 
gam. 
33Admittedly, the whistle blower statutes in other 
jurisdictions are not identical to the Utah statute and are not 
binding on this Court, however, the policy considerations raised 
in those cases should have been considered by the Court of 
Appeals. 
3AHatton-Ward, supra at 45-46. 
35Wolcott v. Champion Int'l Co., 691 F.Supp. 1052 (W.D. 
Mich. 1987). 
10 
If whistle blowers were motivated by a public purpose, a 
requirement that public employees first present their wrongful 
discharge claim to the Civil Service Commission would effectively 
balance the public and private interests. In the hearing before 
the Civil Service Commission, the employee would have a public 
hearing with the rights of representation, cross-examination, the 
opportunity to inspect documents and to offer evidence in 
explanation and rebuttal.36 The elected officials of the 
government and the public would formally be advised of government 
waste allegations and have the opportunity to correct the waste, 
as well as erroneous personnel decisions. 
The Court of Appeals made no citations to other 
jurisdictions who have interpreted whistle blower legislation. 
The Federal Courts,37 however, have reviewed the relationship 
between the Federal Civil Service and Whistle Blower statutes, 
holding that: 
"The civil service format creates an extensive scheme 
regulating civil service personnel decisions . . . We 
decline to allow an employee to circumvent this 
detailed scheme governing federal employer-employee 
relations. To allow suit would otherwise encourage 
aggrieved employees to by-pass the statutory and 
administrative remedies in order to seek direct 
judicial review and thereby deprive the government of 
36D.B. v. Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing, 779 P. 2d 1145 (Utah 1989) and Tolman v. Salt Lake 
County, 818 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1991). 
37Borrell v. United States International Communications 
Agency, 682 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also. Wren v. Merit 
Systems Protection Board, 681 F.2d 867 (D.C. 1982); McGregor v. 
Board of Commissioners of Palm Beach County, 674 F.Supp. 858 
(S.D. Fla. 1987); McDowell v. Cheney, 718 F.Supp. 1531 (M.D. Ga. 
1989). 
11 
the opportunity to work out its personnel problems 
within the framework it has painstakingly 
established,38 
This Court should review the decision of the Court of 
Appeals, especially since it deviates from interpretations made 
in other jurisdictions and disregards policies underlying whistle 
blower legislation. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED QUESTIONS OF 
STATE LAW IN A WAY THAT IS IN CONFLICT WITH 
DECISIONS OF THIS COURT. 
A. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that it is not 
possible to harmonize the Whistle Blower Act with the 
Civil Service statutes. 
According to decisions of this Court, every effort should be 
made by the courts to construe statutes harmoniously in order to 
give effect to every provision in all of them.39 The Court of 
Appeals, however, did not make every effort to construe the 
"Whistle blower" and the "Civil Service" statutes together.40 
Rather, it held that the mere allegation of "whistle blowing" 
permits an aggrieved civil service employee to circumvent, ignore 
and by-pass the remedial scheme established by the Civil Service 
laws.41 The Court of Appeals cites no authority for this 
conclusion. 
Not only is it possible to construe the Civil Service and 
38McPowell, supra at 1544. 
39Murrav City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983). 
40Hat ton-Ward, supra at 49. 
4lHatton-Ward, supra. 
12 
Whistle Blower statutes together, it is necessary to harmonize 
them in order to fulfill legislative intent. 
In construing the statutes harmoniously, the termination of 
a Civil Service employee does not become final under the Whistle 
Blower statute until and unless the employee has appealed the 
discharge to the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service 
Commission would examine the merits of a whistle blower claim and 
serve as a forum for the aggrieved employee to present claims 
regarding improper government conduct. After completing the 
administrative process, the termination is final and the employee 
may proceed to the Courts. Thus, by requiring the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies, effect is given to the purposes of the 
"Whistle blower" and the Civil Service statutes/2 
A2Since the "Whistle Blower" statute covers all public 
employees, the remedial statutes established to redress personnel 
grievances for public employees can be, according to the Court of 
Appeals, nullified by "artful pleading" contrary to principles of 
statutory construction. The State Merit Employees Personnel 
Management Act (§67-19-30 of the Utah Code Ann.) provides, 
through the Career Service Review Board, process to redress not 
only discharges of state employees but also "all grievances based 
upon a claim or charge of injustice or oppression ..." The 
County Personnel Management Act (§§17-33-1 .et seg. of the Utah 
Code Ann.) establishes the Career Service Council which hears 
appeals by County employees of their dismissals, suspensions, 
demotions and transfers. The Deputy Sheriff-Merit System Act 
(§§17-30-1 et. seg. of the Utah Code Ann.) creates the Merit 
System Commission which reviews grievances by Deputy County 
Sheriffs of wrongful discharge and other employment grievances. 
The Firemens Civil Service Commission Act (§§17-28-1 et seg. of 
the Utah Code Ann.) establishes the County Firemens Civil Service 
Commission which is charged by law to fully hear and determine 
whether the "adverse employment action" against a County 
firefighter was for cause. For non-civil service municipal 
employees, the Utah statutes have created the Employee Appeals 
Board (§10-3-1106 of the Utah Code Ann.) which reviews 
terminations and disciplinary transfers for "cause" subject to 
judicial review. 
13 
Further, it must be recognized that the statutes which 
establish the remedial scheme for state, county and municipal 
employees were enacted prior to the "Whistle Blower" statute/3 
This Court held, in Murray Citv:AA 
In terms of legislative intent, it is assumed that 
whenever the legislature enacts a provision, it has in 
mind previous statutes relating to the same subject 
matter, wherefore it is held that in the absence of any 
express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision 
was enacted in accord with the legislative policy 
embodied in those prior statutes, and they all should 
be construed together.45 
Nowhere does the "Whistle Blower" statute repeal, amend or 
modify the Civil Service Act, the State Merit Employees Personnel 
Management Act, the County Personnel Management Act, the Deputy 
Sheriff-Merit System Act, the Firemens Civil Service Act, or the 
Employee Appeals Board statute. Accordingly, this Court must 
review the Court of Appeals decision to undo the judicial repeal 
and nullification of the Civil Service laws. 
B. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that a Civil 
Service employee, who is claiming that he has been 
wrongfully discharged in reprisal for his whistle 
blower activities, is not reguired to exhaust his 
administrative remedies. 
This Court has held that administrative remedies, except in 
rare instances, must first be exhausted before resort may be had 
A3§10-3-1001 et ^ eg;.; 67-19-30; 17-30-1 et seg.; 17-21-1 et 
seg. and 10-3-1106 of the Utah Code Ann. 
44Supra. 
A5Id. at 1314. 
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to judicial review*6 
Contrary to decisions issued by this Court, the Court of 
Appeals views the exhaustion of administrative remedies 
requirement as an exception which should be expressed, or 
strongly implied, in the statute. 
Important policy considerations underlie the doctrine of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies. First, the requirement 
provides to the government the opportunity to discover, mitigate 
and cure any erroneous personnel actions, without judicial 
intervention/7 Next, the exhaustion of administrative remedies 
involves a policy of orderly procedure which favors a preliminary 
administrative sifting process that minimizes attempts to "swamp 
the courts" by resort to them in the first instance/8 
Requiring exhaustion is further based on the policy that it is 
desirable to have the administrative process develop the 
necessary factual background upon which the courts could then 
make informed decisions on their review. 
Further, without the exhaustion requirement, it is possible 
that the frequent and deliberate flouting would encourage 
46S&G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1990); State 
Department of Social Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982); 
State Tax Commission v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519 (Utah 1989); 
Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 
1980); Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning, 659 P.2d 1065 (Utah 
1983); Hi-Country Homeowners v. Public Service Commission of 
Utah, 779 P.2d 682 (Utah 1989); Williams v. Public Service 
Commission of Utah, 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988). 
A7McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 1JB5, 195 (1969). 
482 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law §595. 
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employees to ignore the comprehensive remedial scheme established 
by Utah statute to redress the personnel grievances of state, 
county and municipal employees. 
The Court of Appeals' holding, pertaining to the exhaustion 
requirement, is contrary to the rulings of this Court in Johnson 
v. Utah State Retirement49 and S&G, Inc. v. Morgan50. 
This Court, in Johnson, stated that an assertion of a 
constitutional issue does not obviate the need for exhaustion. 
The instant case involves such issues other than the 
constitutional claim, and pursuit of plaintiffs' 
administrative remedies might obviate the need of addressing 
that issue. If not, judicial attention to the 
constitutional issue, as well as other issues, will be 
better framed by the structure of a factual context.51 
Further, this Court reviewed the policy considerations 
underlying the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies 
in S&G/ Inc. v. Morgan.52 Similar to the holding of the Court 
of Appeals, the plaintiffs in S&G/ Inc. argued that the statute 
in question did not impose a requirement of prior participation 
in the administrative process and, therefore, the plaintiffs did 
not need to participate at the administrative level. In response 
to the S&G, Inc. plaintiffs, this Court held that: 
The requirement of participation as a prerequisite to 
standing to appeal is a corollary of the doctrine of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is well 
settled under this doctrine that persons aggrieved by 
A9621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980). 
50797 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1990). 
31
 Johnson, supra at 1237. 
52797 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1990). 
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decisions of administrative agencies may not, by 
refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to such 
agencies, by-pass them and call upon the courts to 
determine matters properly determinable originally by 
such agencies.53 
Accordingly, contrary to the holding of the Court of 
Appeals, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies 
applies to the Whistle Blower statute even though it does not 
express, or strongly imply, such requirement. 
C. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Courts 
have exclusive jurisdiction over claims by Civil 
Service employees that they were wrongfully terminated 
from their employment allegedly for their whistle 
blower activities. 
The Court of Appeals held that jurisdiction of a wrongful 
discharge claim, based on allegations of whistle blower 
activities, vests in the Courts and not with the Civil Service 
Commission.54 
The ruling by the Court of Appeals, nullifying the 
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, is contrary to a 
long line of cases decided by this Court.55 This Court has 
consistently held that: 
The Civil Service Commission is made the ultimate 
authority to determine whether the discharge [of a 
53S&G, Inc., supra at 1087. 
Hatton-Ward, supra at 45, 46. 54 
55Vetterli v. Civil Service Commission of Salt Lake City, 
145 P.2d 794 (Utah 1944); Piercev v. Civil Service Commission of 
Salt Lake City, 208 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1949); Erkman v. Civil 
Service Commission, 198 P.2d 238 (Utah 1948); Child v. Salt Lake 
City Civil Service Commission, 575 P.2d 195 (Utah 1978); Worrall 
v. Qgden City Fire Department, 616 P.2d 598 (Utah 1980). 
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police officer] should or should not stand.56 
According to this Court, the Civil Service Commission has 
the initial jurisdiction, by statute, to hear all appeals from 
discharged municipal police officers. This Court has 
specifically decided that the Civil Service Commission can review 
whistle blower type cases involving civil service employees.57 
In whistle blower cases, the Civil Service Commission and 
the courts have concurrent jurisdiction. A leading authority on 
administrative law has stated that: 
When there are two forums available, one judicial and 
the other administrative, a party is required to run 
the administrative remedial course before seeking 
judicial solution . . . The primary jurisdiction 
doctrine means that once an agency is set up and 
jurisdiction over cases conferred upon it, the agency 
is automatically vested with the exclusive original 
jurisdiction over those cases . . .58 
The Court of Appeals' holding, that the Courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction in wrongful discharge actions of civil 
service employees, is contrary to the decisions of this Court. 
D. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that a public 
employee, who claims wrongful termination, may elect 
not to seek reinstatement and by-pass the 
administrative process. 
The Court of Appeals accepted, without discussion, the 
premise that a Civil Service employee, who is claiming wrongful 
discharge, may elect not to seek reinstatement. Certainly, the 
56 Child, supra at 196. 
57Erkman v. Civil Service Commission of Provo City, 198 P.2d 
238 (Utah 1948); Fisher v. Civil Service Commission of Salt Lake 
City, 499 P.2d 854 (Utah 1972). 
58B. Schwartz, Administrative Law, 527 (3rd Ed. 1991). 
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doctrine of administrative .remedies would be useless if the 
discharged employee was not required to take advantage of all 
corrective procedures provided for in the administrative process. 
This Court, however, has determined that "persons aggrieved 
by decisions of administrative agencies may not, by refusing or 
neglecting to submit issues of fact to such agencies, by-pass 
them and call upon the courts to determine matters properly 
determinable originally by such agencies.39 
A terminated Civil Service employee should be required to 
mitigate, not escalate, damages by first seeking reinstatement 
through the administrative process. 
E. The Court of Appeals erred by failing to assume the 
correctness of the lower court decision since Hatton-Ward 
never cited the record in his brief. 
On appeal, the City presented its Statement of Facts 
supported by the record. Hatton-Ward, however, made no citations 
to the record to support his factual allegations and proffered 
his alleged facts for the first time on appeal.60 Hatton-Ward 
was, therefore, not bound by any specific facts and his claim, on 
appeal, either changed or was never clear to the lower court or 
the City. 
The City strongly objected to Hatton-Ward's efforts to 
create a new record for the first time on appeal. 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that 
the brief of an appellant shall contain " . . . all statements of 
59S&G Inc., supra at 1087. 
^Appellant's brief at 7. 
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fact and references to the proceeding below shall be supported by 
citations to the record." This Court has consistently held that 
". . . if a party fails to make a concise statement of facts and 
citation of the pages in the record where those facts are 
supported, the Court will assume the correctness of the judgment 
below.61 Hatton-Ward's failure to comply with Rule 24 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure should have been an independent 
basis for affirmance of the lower court's decision. The Court of 
Appeals, in its opinion, should have addressed this issue.62 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, the City respectfully 
requests this Court to grant a Writ of Certiorari to review the 
decision of the Court of Appeals. 
DATED this /fT^day of Hpri I , 1992. 
FRANK M. NAKAMURA / 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorney for Defendants 
FMN:cc 
61Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1987) 
62Hatton-Ward, supra. 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Frank HATTON-WAJRD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
• . 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, and 
Mike Chabries, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 910585-CA 
FILED: March 17, 1992 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Leonard H. Russon 
ATTORNEYS: 
Suzanne M. Dailimore, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant 
Roger F. Cutler and Frank M. Nakamura, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Orrae. 
This opinion is subject Co revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
GARFF, Jndge: 
Frank Hatton-Ward appeals an order 
dismissing his complaint in which he alleges 
Salt Lake City Corporation (City) wrongfully 
terminated his employment in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §67-21-1 (1986 & Supp. 
1991) (whistle blower statute). The trial court 
dismissed his complaint for failure co first 
exhaust his administrative remedies before the 
Civil Service Commission (Commission) pur-
suant to Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1012 
(1986) (civil service statute). We reverse. 
FACTS 
Although. Hatton-Ward presents a detailed 
and lengthy factual statement in his brief, we 
find no need to reiterate all of the facts in 
order to address the issues on appeal. There-
fore, we state an abbreviated version of the 
events leading to his termination. 
Hatton-Ward was a member of the Salt 
Lake City Police Department up until October 
30, 1989, when he was fired. From 1985 to 
1988, a number of young women were murd-
ered in Salt Lake City and neighboring com-
munities. These murders were apparently 
related. Although the police made some arrests 
in connection with the investigation, Hatton-
Ward believed some of the perpetrators were 
still at large, so he continued his own unaut-
horized investigation, j 
Because Hatton-Ward believed his super-
iors were intentionally ignoring his leads, he 
took his information to higher authorities, 
including the Utah Attorney General's Office. 
Hatton-Ward eventually petitioned this court 
for a writ of mandamus to compel the City to 
follow his leads and pursue the investigation 
more efficiently. This court denied the petition 
without prejudice based on lack of jurisdic-
tion. Shortly thereafter, Hatton-Ward was 
terminated from his position for insubordin-
ation, neglect of duties, misconduct, incomp-
etency, and failure to observe the rules of che 
department. 
Hatton-Ward then sued the City and Mike 
Chabries, the Salt Lake City Chief of Police, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §67-21-1, the 
whistle blower statute. This statute prohibits 
terminations, threats and discrimination by 
employers in retaliation for employees' having 
called attention to misuse and waste of public 
funds. Hatton-Ward sought damages of six 
million dollars. However, he did not seek 
reinstatement. 
The district court dismissed the suit because 
Hatton-Ward failed to exhaust his adminis-
trative remedies before the Commission purs-
uant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The sole issue before this court Is one of 
statutory interpretation: whether Hatton-
Ward, as a government employee, is required 
to first exhaust his administrative remedies 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1012 
before commencing an action in state court 
under the whistle blower statute, Utah Code 
Ann. §67-21-1. In other words, the issue is 
whether the whistle blower statute implicitly 
incorporates the requirements of the civil 
service statute. 
I We do not defer to a trial court's interpre-
i tation of a statute, and thus review it indepe-
ndently. Mendez v. State, 313 P.2d 1234, 1236 
(Utah App. 1991); Stare v. Swapp, 308 P.2d 
115,120 (Utah App. 1991). 
When statutory language is plain and una-
mbiguous, we do not look beyond the same to 
divine legislative intent. Bhnkerhoff v. Forsyth, 
779 P.2d 6S5, 696 (Utah 1989); Stare v. 
Singh. 319 ?2d 356, 359 (Utah App. 1991). 
Rather, we construe a statute according to its 
plain language. Brinkerhoff, 779 P.2d at 696. 
Specifically, we will not interpret unambiguous 
language in a statute to contradict its plain 
meaning. Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497, 
500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam); Johnson v. 
Utah State Retirement Bd.. 770 P.2d 93, 95 
(Utah 1988). 
Moreover, "where two statutes treat the 
same subject matter, and one statute is general 
while the other is specific, the specific provi-
sion controls.* Floyd v. Western Surgical 
Assocs. Inc., 773 ?JA 401, 404 (Utah App, 
1989); accord Williams / . Public Serv. 
Comm'n 754P.2d 41,48 (Utah 1988); Bagshaw 
*. Bagshavr. 788 P.*2d 1057, 1060 
(Utah-App. 1990). 
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WHISTLE BLOWER STATUTE 
The whistle blower statute provides a cause 
of action for a government employee who 
alleges his or her employer has taken an 
"adverse action* including "to discharge, thr-
eaten, or otherwise discriminate ... in any 
manner* in' retaliation for the employee's 
having communicated "the existence of any 
waste of public funds, property, or manpower, 
or a violation or suspected violation of a law, 
rule, or regulation adopted under the law of 
this state." Utah Code Ann. §§67-21-2(1) 
and-3(l) (Supp. 1991). To pursue a cause of 
action, the employee brings "a civil action for 
appropriate injunctive relief or actual 
damages, or both, within 130 days after the 
occurrence of the alleged violation." Utah 
Code Ann. §67-21-4(2). To prevail, the 
plaintiff must prove the elements by a prepo-
nderance of the evidence. Utah Code Ann. 
§67-21-4(4). 
The remedies under this statute include 
compensation for damages for injury or loss, 
including court costs and reasonable attorney 
fees. Utah Code Ann. §67-21-4(1). Other 
remedies include reinstatement, back wages, 
reinstatement of fringe benefits and seniority 
rights, actual damages, or any combination of 
these remedies. Utah Code Ann. §67-21-
5(1). In addition, the employee can seek 
compensation for costs of litigation, reason-
able attorney fees and witness fees. Utah Code 
Ann. §67-21-5(2). Finally, a court can 
order a violator of this statute to pay a civil 
fine of up to $500 to the General Fund. Utah 
Code Ann. §67-21-6. 
On its face, we see nothing in the language 
requiring an employee first to bring a whistle 
blower claim to the Commission before filing 
an action in state court. Indeed, such an 
implied requirement would make it difficult, if 
not impossible, to bring a claim in state court 
within the required 180 days of the alleged 
violation. Utah Code Ann. §67-21-4(2). 
Moreover, the following plain and unamb-
iguous language explicitly shows, with our 
emphases, that jurisdiction clearly vests in the 
state court and not with the Commission: *An 
employee ... may bring a civil action ....* 
Utah Code Ann- §67-21-4(2). *An action 
... may be brought in the drcuir court where 
the complainant resides, or the county where 
he person against whom the civil complaint is 
lied resides ....* Utah Code Ann. §67-21-
<3). "A court, in rendering a judgment in an ac-
\on ... may order [lists remedies]. A court 
tay also award the complainant ... the costs 
f litigation, ... if the court determines that 
\e award Is appropriate.* Utah Code Ann. 
57-21-5. 
la contrast, the civil service statute, found 
a totally different part of the Utah Code, 
yvides that civil service employees who are 
moved from office ... for misconduct. 
incompetency or failure to perform ... duties 
or failure to observe properly the rules of the 
department," may appeal their discharges to 
the Commission. Utah Code Ann. §10-3-
1012. The appeal to the Commission must be 
brought within five days of the date of disc-
harge. Id. The Commission then "shall fully 
hear and determine the matter. The discharged 
person shall be entitled to appear in person 
and to have counsel and a public hearing. * Id. 
An order from the Commission may be 
appealed to this court to determine whether 
"the commission has abused its discretion or 
exceeded its authority." Utah Code Ann. §10-
3-1012.5 (Supp. 1991). See WorraU v. Ogdcn 
Gty Fire DepX 616 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 
1980). 
Both the Commission review and the appeal 
to this court involve only the issue of whether 
the discharge should stand and related quest-
ions of back pay and seniority rights. Utah 
Code Ann. §10-3-1012; Vvorra/f, 616 P.2d 
at 602; Child v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. 
Comm% 575 P.2d 195, 196 (Utah 1978). 
Also, remedies such as attorney fees, civil 
damages and civil fines are not mentioned in 
the civil service statute. Utah Code Ann. §67-
19a-406(4). 
Nothing in the language of the civil service 
statute empowers the Commission to hear 
certain claims specified in the whistle blower 
statute such as threats and discrimination 
made in retaliation for whistle blowing. Utah 
Code Ana . § § 6 7 - 2 1 - 2 ( 1 ) a n d - 3 ( i ) . 
Neither does the language of the civil service 
statute suggest that the Commission is empo-
wered to provide any remedy other than those 
related to reinstatement. Utah Code Ann. §10-
3-1012; WorraU, 616 P.2d at 602; Child. SIS 
?2d at 196. In particular, the Commission is 
barred from granting attorney fees, which may 
be awarded in the whistle blower statute, Utah 
Code Ann. §67-19a-406(4), as well as civil 
damages, and civil fines. 
We note that here, Hatton-Ward is not 
seeking reinstatement, but rather civil damages 
and attorney fees. Thus, it makes no sense to 
require him first to go to the Commission to 
pursue a remedy he does not want. The law 
does not require the exhaustion of administr-
ative remedies when it would serve no useful 
purpose. State Tax Comm'n v. [vetson9 782 
P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989); Johnson v. Utah 
State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234, 1237 
(Utah 1980). Moreover, once an employee 
brings an action before the Commission, he or 
she is then codded only to a review of whether 
the Commission exceeded its discretion and 
jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. §10-3-
1012.5. We thus see nothing in the plain and 
unambiguous language of either the whistle 
. blower statute or the civil service statute sug-
gesting a claimant must first bnng a whistle 
blower claim to the Commission before proc-
eeding in state court. 
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THE CITY'S ARGUMENTS 
The City argues that the trial court properly 
dismissed the case because the Commission 
has primary jurisdiction over all such discha-
rges. However, the cases cited by the City 
support only the proposition that the Comm-
ission has original jurisdiction over whether 
the discharge itself should or should not stand. 
E.g., WorraU, 616 P.2d at 602; Child, 575 
P.2d at 195; Vcttcrli v. Civil Scrv. Comm'n, 
106 Utah 83, 145 P.2d 792, 796 (Utah 1944). 
The City also argues that the Commission is 
empowered to determine whether the whistle 
blower statute was violated, despite the fact 
that the whistle blower statute vests jurisdic-
tion in state court. In suppon of this propos-
ition, the City cites Erkman v. Civil Scrv. 
Comm'n, 114 Utah 83, 198 P.2d 238 (Utah 
1948) and Fisher v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 499 
P.2d 854 (Utah 1972). While these cases 
involve employees discharged for alleging 
waste, they are nonetheless inapposite. First, 
both cases were decided before the whistle 
blower statute was enacted. More importantly, 
the issue before the Commission in both cases 
was confined to whether the discharges should 
stand. 
Finally, the City argues that the two statutes 
should be construed together and harmonized 
because they have the common purpose of 
giving terminated employees the opportunity 
to seek review of their terminations. In 
suppon of this argument, the City cites Murray 
City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 
(Utah 1983) (statutes referring to same subject 
matter should be construed with reference to 
each other and harmonized where possible). 
First, for reasons discussed above, it is not 
possible to "harmonize" the two statutes so as 
to include an exhaustion requirement in the 
whistle blower statute. Second, the subject 
matter of the two statutes is different: The 
civil service statute provides a review as to 
whether a civil employee's discharge should or 
should not stand, whereas the whistle blower 
statute provides a civil cause of action and 
broad civil remedies when an employee alleges 
the employer threatened, discriminated 
against, or discharged the employee for whistle 
blowing.1 Third, other state courts have found 
that exhaustion of administrative remedies is 
not required where the remedy sought is one 
that the administrative body is not empowered 
to provide. See Pounds v. Denisoa, 115 Idaho 
381, 766 P.2d 1262, 1265-66 (Ct. App. 1988) 
(actions sounding in ton cannot be remedied 
by administrative body, thus exhaustion not 
required); Collopy v. Wildlife Comm'n, 625 
P.2d 994, 1006 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) 
(exhaustion not required when existing admi-
nistrative remedies are ill-adapted to provide 
relief sought, and when issue is one of law 
rather than one committed to administrative 
discretion and expertise). Finally, there is 
nothing disharmonious in our construction 
that employees who seek review of whether 
their discharge should stand must exhaust their 
administrative remedies pursuant to the civil 
service statute, while those employees who 
allege retaliation for whistle blowing may seek 
relief in state coun pursuant to the whistle 
blower statute. 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the order of dismissal on the 
ground that the trial coun erred in dismissing 
Hatton-Ward's complaint for failure to 
exhaust his administrative remedies. 
Reversed. 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. The City also cues to what it claims is the federal 
equivalent of the Utah whistle blower statute. 5 
U.S.C. §2302. This federal statute has been inter-
preted to include an exhaustion requirement, where 
constitutional issues are not involved. Borrell v. 
United States Int'l Communications Agency, 682 
F.2d 981, 987-88 (D.C. Cir. 1982). This argument 
fails because the federal statute is not parallel to the 
state statute, as it creates no civil cause of action 
and provides no remedies other than reinstatement. 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE of Utah, 
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BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
James F. Gardner appeals his conviction of 
a single count of forgery on jurisdictional 
grounds. We affirm. 
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K S C E I V E D 
CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK HATTON-WARD, an 
individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
a Municipal Corporation, and 
MIXS CKABRIES, in his capacity 
as Chief of the Salt Lake 
City Police Department, a 
Law Enforcement Agency, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
CIVIL NO. 890905662 CV 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's Complaint for 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies has been submitted 
for decision pursuant to Rale 4-501 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration. In support of the said Motion 
defendant has filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities. 
Plaintiff has filed a Memorandua in response thereto, to which 
defendants have filed a responsive Memorandum. The Court has 
reviewed this file and the Memoranda submitted by counsel, and 
rules as follows. 
HATTON-WARD V. SALT LAKE CITY PAGE TWO RULING 
Plaintiff's Complaint, which was filed on November 2, 1939, 
basically alleges that plaintiff, as a Salt Lake City Police 
Officer, became aware of information concerning serial murders 
and possible gang connections, that his superiors refused to 
act upon such information and ordered him to cease his 
investigation into those areas, and upon his refusal to do so, 
wrongfully terminated his employment. Kis Complaint sets forth 
an historical account of his investigation as a police officer, 
the alleged failure of his superiors to act upon such 
information, and his superiors' orders to cease his 
investigation in those areas. He alleges that he, therefore, 
took his complaints to "higher authority,rt including the Utah 
Attorney General's Office, the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office, and the F3I, which took no action, wherein plaintiff 
filed a Writ of Mandamus with the Utah State Court of Appeals,' 
which was subsequently dismissed. He alleges that his 
superiors warned him that if he continued to involve himself in 
the above-mentioned investigations, he would be fired and that 
he was subsequently harassed by his superiors, eventually 
resulting in a suspension and a subsequent disciplinary 
hearing. He alleges that he was terminated on October 30, 1989 
for insubordination, neglect of duties, incompetency, 
HATTON-WARD V. SALT LAKE CITY PAGE THREE RULING 
disclosure of confidential information, and unauthorized 
statements to the press, but that the real reason for his 
termination was for "whistle blowing11 under Section 67-27-1, 
Utah Code Ann. 
Plaintiff alleges that the failure of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department, defendants herein, to investigate and follow 
up in those areas of his investigation resulted in "waste of 
public funds, property or manpower," within the meaning of 
Section 67-21-3(1)(a)(i) , Utah Code Ann. Plaintiff claims he 
is a "whistle blower" pursuant to the aforementioned statute, 
and therefore has the right to bring this action in this Court. 
Defendants Salt Lake City Corporation and its Chief of 
Police have filed a Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's Complaint for 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Motion to 
Dismiss basically alleges that Salt Lake City is a city of the 
first class and, therefore, subject to Title 10 of Utah Code 
Ann.; that Salt Lake City maintains a police department of 
which plaintiff was an employee; that plaintiff, as a police 
officer of the Salt Lake City Police Department, was classified 
as civil service, and covered by the Civil Service provisions 
of Title 10. 
HATTON-WARD V. SALT LAKE CITY PAGE FOUR RULING 
The defendants argue that pursuant to Section 10-3-1012, 
Utah Code Ann., civil service employees may be removed from 
office by the head of the department for misconduct, 
incompetency, failure to perform duties, and failure to observe 
rules of the department:, and that appeal from such discharge is 
directly to the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service 
Commission muse hold a public hearing, make findings and arrive 
at a decision. The Decision is final. (Section 10-3-1012.) 
The City alleges chat plaintiff's termination as 
demonstrated by plaintiff's Complaint, by the letter of 
termination, and the Affidavit of the Chief of Police, was 
clearly for insubordination, neglect of duties, incompetency, 
undermining of authority, and disruption of the operation of 
the department, disclosure of confidential information, abuse 
of sick leave, and past work history demonstrating a refusal to 
respond to progressive discipline. It is argued that 
plaintiff's discharge is subject to the Civil Service Act, and 
appeal of the discharge was to the Civil Service Commission. 
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The Utah Protection of Public Employees Act (sometimes 
referred to as the "whistle blowers" Act) protects a public 
employee from retributive action by his or her public employer 
in cases where such employee communicates the existence of "any 
waste of public funds, property, or manpower, or a violation or 
suspected violation of a law, rule or regulation. " 
Section 67-21-1, et saq., Utah Cede Ann. 
The said Ace, however, is not meant to replace the Civil 
Service Act in cases involving civil service employees, nor can 
it be used to circumvent the requirements of the Civil Service 
Act. Both Acts must be considered together. 
The Utah Protection of Public Employees Act must be given 
reasonable interpretation. The waste of public funds, property 
or manpower must be real and demonstrable. Evidence of a 
public employee using public funds to build a personal cabin, 
or invest in personal investments, would certainly be 
indicative of waste of public funds. Or, evidence indicating 
public employees being used by superiors to build such cabin, 
or to perform other work for personal gain would be indicative 
of waste of manpower. However, evidence that one employee may 
work faster than another, or chat one employee may be more 
efficient in "doing things/1 may not be sufficient to 
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constitute waste as contemplated by the whistle blower Act. 
Wrongful termination of an employee in one situation may 
clearly come within the whistle blower Act, while wrongful 
termination of an employee in another situation may find no 
such application whatsoever. 
In anv case, a claim of wrongful termination of a civil 
service employee for whatever reason is subject to the Civil 
Service Act and its requirements. The Civil Service Commission 
hearing an appeal of wrongful discharge of a civil service 
employee must consider whether or not the termination of the 
employee was wrongful for any legal reason including violation 
of the CJtah Protection of Public Employees Act. If this were 
not the case, a terminated employee could circumvent the Civil 
Service Act by merely alleging that he or she was terminated 
for whistle blowing as to waste of public funds or manpower for 
any number of reasons. 
Section 10-3-1012, Utah Code Ann., provides that "All 
persons in the classified civil service" may be terminated for 
"misconduct, incompetency or failure to perform his duties or 
failure to observe properly the rules of the department." 
Such discharged person has a right of appeal to the Civil 
Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission has the 
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obligation to "fully hear and determine the matter," and in 
doing so to afford the discharged person a protection of his or 
her rights, including the right to appear in person, have legal 
counsel, and a public hearing." The said statute provides that 
the finding and decision of the Civil Service Commission shall 
be final- Section 1C-3-1012, Utah Code Ann. 
The Civil Service Commission naturally must give full 
consideration of the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act, 
where such is alleged on appeal, and make a determination as to 
whether or not the employee was wrongfully terminated in 
violation of that Act. 
The City, through its Civil Service Commission, must have 
the right to correct errors made in regards to its civil 
service employees, if any, and such right is assured by the 
civil service appeal process established by law. 
The decision of the Civil Service Commission to discharge 
an employee is subject to review by the District Court. In 
Child v. Salt Lake Citv Civil Service Commission, 575 P.2d 195 
(Utah 1973), a case dealing with the termination of a Salt Lake 
City Police Officer, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The finding and " decision of the Civil! 
Service Commission is final, however, case 
law and the Utah Constitution afford 
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judicial review. These cases [Cases cited] 
illustrate the differing viewpoints as to 
exactly what is reviewable — jurisdictional 
questions only or the merits of an order of 
termination. This problem has been 
clarified in Rule 655(b) (2) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure wherein it is 
provided that relief nay be granted 'when an 
inferior tribunal, board or officer 
exercising judicial functions has exceeded 
its jurisdiction or abused its discretion.' 
Plaintiff sought relief in the district 
court, which is proper under the rules as 
that court can take additional evidence when 
deemed necessary. In the instant case, the 
district court gave summary judgment on the 
record alone, thereby affirming the 
Commission's order. 
In the case at bar, plaintiff clearly was a civil service 
employee of the Salt Lake City Police Department. He was 
terminated on October 30, 1939 for insubordination, neglect of 
duties, incompetency, undermining of authority, disruption of 
operation of the department, disclosure of confidential 
information, abuse of sick leave, and a work history of refusal 
to respond to progressive discipline. His appeal, based upon 
any and all defenses, including the whistle blower act, was 
directly to the Civil Service Commission. He did not appeal to 
the Civil Service Commission before filing this action, 
therefore has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 
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For the reasons stated above and the reasons stated by 
defendants in their Memorandum in support of their Motion to 
Dismiss and responsive Memorandum, the Court grants the said 
Motion to Dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies. 
Defendant's attorney will prepare the Order of Dismissal. 
Dated this ^ ^ dav of February, 1990. 
LEONARD H. RUSSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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1991. Muniripalities not electing to assume local re-
sponsibility for the jurisdiction of the justice courts on 
January 1,1992, may make such an election effective 
on July 1 of any even-numbered year starting in 1994 
by written declaration delivered to the Judicial Coun-
d l at least one year prior to the effective date of the 
election. 
(6) Once made, the election of a munidpality to 
assume local responsibility for the jurisdiction of the 
justice court may not be revoked without the prior 
approval of the Legislature. To obtain the approval of 
the Legislature, the governing authority of the mu-
nidpality shall petition the Legislature to adopt a 
joint resolution to approve the revocation. The munic-
ipality shall also provide notice to the Judicial Coun-
d l not later than the July 1 immediately prior to the 
general session of its intent to seek legislative ap-
proval. 
(7) (a) For the purposes of this section, to "assume 
local responsibility for the jurisdiction of the jus-
tice court" means to: 
(i) establish a justice court within the mu-
nidpality: 
(ii) establish a justice court under Chapter 
13. Title 11, Interlocal Co-operation Act; or 
(iii) adjudicate those matters within the 
jurisdiction of the justice court in the county 
precinct justice court 
(b) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and 
(3), a munidpality may amend its method of as-
suming local responsibility for the jurisdiction of 
the justice court without legislative approval. 
(8) It is the intent of the Legislature that the Judi-
cial Council by rule provide resources and procedures 
adequate for the timely disposition of all matters 
brought before the courts. It is the intent of the Legis-
lature that based on the allocation of responsibility 
between courts of record and not of record, the admin-
istrative office of the courts and local governments 
cooperate in allocating resources to operate the courts 
in the most efficient and effective manner. IWI 
10-3-924. A p p o i n t m e n t of manager . 
The governing body of any a t y or town may by 
ordinance establish a manager form of government 
and appoint any person to be known as the manager. 
1*77 
10-3-925. Term of office. 
The manager shall serve at the pleasure of the gov-
erning body except that the governing body may em-
ploy the manager for a term not to exceed three 
years. The term of employment may be renewed at 
any time. Any person serving as manager of a munic-
ipality under this section may be removed with or 
without cauae by a majority vote of the governing 
body. Ian 
10-3-926. Duties of the manager. 
*' The governing body shall, by ordinance or resolu-
tion, prescribe the powers, duties and obligations of 
the manager. 1977 
10-3-927. Legislative powers and official posi-
tion of the mayor not delegated. 
The legislative and judicial powers of the mayor, 
his position as chairman of the governing body and 
any ex offirio position the mayor shall hold shall not 
be delegated to th# m«n*<~ 
(1) The dty attorney may prosecute violation* 4 
dty ordinances and has the same powers in respect^ 
violations of d ty ordinances as are exercised by | 
county attorney in respect to violations of state U* 
induding, but not limited to, granting immunity ^ 
witnesses for violations of dty ordinances. 
(2) The dry attorney may be sworn as a deputy 
public prosecutor by the attorney general, the county 
attorney of the county in which the a t y is situated, or 
any other public prosecutor having junsdictiot 
within the dty limits. Appointments as deputy public 
prosecutor shall be for a period of time as specified it 
the time of oath taking but shall not exceed one yetr 
and shall be subject to renewal Upon such oath, the 
d ty attorney may prosecute, in the name of the state 
of Utah, any class A misdemeanor enumerated u 
such by the Legislature and committed within the 
territorial limits of the dty . it* 
Attorney duties —- Deputy public 
prosecutor [Effective January 1,1992L 
In dties with a dty attorney, the d ty attorney ma? 
prosecute violations of dty ordinances, and under 
state law, infractions and misdemeanors occumnf 
within the boundaries of the municipality and ha* 
the same powers in respect to the violations as are 
exercised by a county attorney, induding, but not 
limited to, granting immunity to witnesses. The aty 
attorney shall represent the interests of the state or 
the munidpality in the appeal of any matter prose* 
cured in any trial court by the dty attorney. ISM 
P A R T 10 
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 
10-3-100 L Subordinates in police, health, and 
fire departments to be appointed from 
list 
The head of each of the police and ore departments 
of dties of the first and second class and the health 
officer in dties of the first dass shall, by and with the 
advice and consent of the board of dty commissioners. 
and subject to the rules and regulations of the avil 
service commission, appoint from the classified civil 
service list furnished by the dvil service commission 
all subordinate officers, employees, members or 
agents in his department, and in like manner fill all 
vacandes in the same. i*77 
10-3-1002. Classified civil service — Employ-
ment constitat ing. 
The classified dvil service shall consist of all places 
of employment now existing or hereafter created in or 
under the police department and the fire department 
of each d t y of the first and second class, and the 
health department in dt ies of the first class, except 
the head of the departments, deputy chiefs of the po-
lice and fire departments and assistant chiefs of the 
police department in dt ies of the first and second 
class, and the members of the board of health of the 
departments. No appointments to any of the places of 
employment constituting the classified dvi l service 
in the departments shall be made except according » 
law and under the rules and regulations of the Civil 
Service Commission, The head of each of the depart-
ments may. and the deputy chiefs of the noiice and 
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104-1003. Commission — Number, tens* vacan-
cies. 
[a each city of the first and second class there shall 
^ a civil service commission, consisting of three 
^embers appointed by the board of commissioners. 
Xheir term of office shall be six years, buc they shall 
be appointed so that the term of office of one member 
jkall expire on the 30th day of June of each even-
auxnbered year. If a vacancy occurs in the civil ser-
vice commission, it shall be filled by appointment by 
±e board of city commissioners for the unexpired 
term. IST7 
10-3-1004. Qualifications of commissioners — 
Salary — Removal. 
tfot more than two members of the civil service 
commission shall at any one time be of the same po-
litical party. No member of the civil service commis-
sion shall during his tenure of office hold any other 
public office, or be a candidate for any other public 
office. Each member shall receive $25 for each meet-
ing of the commission which he shall attend, but shall 
not receive more than $100 in any one month. In case 
of misconduct, inability or willful neglect in the per-
formance of the duties of the office by any member, 
the member may be removed from office by the board 
of city commissioners by a majority vote of the entire 
membership, but the member shall, if he so desires. 
have opportunity to be heard in defense. ISTT 
10-3-1005. Organization of commission — Secre-
tary — Offices. 
The civil service commission shall organize by se-
lecting one of its members chairman, and shall ap-
point as secretary one of the available officers or em-
ployees of the city, who shall act and serve without 
additional compensation. The secretary shall keep a 
record of ail meetings of the civil service commission 
and of its work and shall perform such other services 
as the commission may require, and shall have the 
custody of the books and records of the commission. 
The board of city commissioners shall provide suit-
able accommodations and equipment to enable the 
cm! service commission to attend to its business. 
1977 
10-3-1006. Rules and regulations — Printing 
and distribution. 
The civil service commission shall make all neces-
sary rules and regulations to carry out the purposes 
of this part and for examinations, appointments and 
promotions. All rules and regulations shall be printed 
by the civil service commission for distribution, ism 
therefor. Such appointment shall be on probation, 
and of a character and for a period to be prescribed by 
the civil service commission. isrr 
10-3-1009. Certification of applicants for posi-
tion — Number — Eligible lists, re-
moval. 
Whenever a position in the classified civil service is 
to be filled, the civil service commission shall as soon 
as possible certify to the appointing power the names 
of five persons to fill such position from those persons 
having the highest standing in the eligible list but a 
lesser number may be certified when there is not the 
required number on the eligible list. If more than one 
position is available in the same department, the civil 
service commission shall also certify to the appoint-
ing power one additional name for each additional 
position to be filled. All persons not appointed shall 
be restored to their relative positions on the eligible 
list. All persons who have been on the eligible list for 
two years without appointment 3hail be removed 
therefrom and can only be returned thereto upon reg-
ular examination. 1983 
10-3-1010. Promotions — Basis — Certification 
of applicants. 
The civil service commission shall provide for pro-
motion in the classified civil service on the basis of 
ascertained merit, seniority in service and standing 
obtained by competitive examination, and shall pro-
vide, in ail cases where practicable, that vacancies 
shall be filled by promotion from the members of the 
next lower rank as submit themselves for the exami-
nation and promotion. The civil service commission 
shall certify to the appointing power the names of not 
more than five applicants having the highest rating 
for each promotion. 18*3 
10-3-1011. Temporary employees. 
The head of each department, with the advice and 
consent of the board of city commissioners, may em-
ploy any person for temporary work only, without 
making the appointment from the certified list, but 
the appointment shall not be longer than one month 
in the same calendar year, and under no circum-
stances shall the temporary employee be appointed to 
a permanent position unless he shall have been duly 
certified by the civil service commission as in other 
cases. iff?? 
10-3-1007. Examinations. 
All applicants for employment in the classified civil 
service shall be subject to examination, which shall 
be public, competitive and free. Examinations shall 
be held at such times and places as the civil service 
commission shall from tune to time determine, and 
shall be for the purpose of determining the qualifica-
tions of applicants for positions. Examinations shall 
be practical and shall fairly test the fitness in every 
aspect of the persons examined to discharge the du-
tfes of the positions to which they seek to be ap-
pointed, and shall include tests of physical qualifica-
tions and health. isrr 
10-3-1008. Appointments from civil service list 
— Probation period* 
la all cases the appointing power shall notify the 
civil service commission of each separate position to 
be rilled, and shall fill such piece by the appointment 
of one of the persons certified by the commission 
10-3-1012. Suspension or discharge by depart-
ment head — Appeal to commission — 
Hearing and decision-
All persons in the classified civil service may be 
suspended as provided in Section 10-3-912, or re-
moved from office or employment by the head of the 
department for misconduct, incompetency, failure to 
perform his duties, or failure to observe properly the 
rules of the department, but subject to appeal by the 
suspended or discharged person to the civil service 
commission. Any person suspended or discharged 
may, within five days from the issuance by the head 
of the department of the order suspending or dis-
charging him, appeal to the civil service commission, 
which shall fully hear and determine the matter. The 
suspended or discharged person 3hall be entitled to 
appear in person and to have counsel and a public 
hearing The ffodiwy and decision of the civil service 
commission upon the hearing shall be certified, to the 
head of the department from whose order the appeal' 
is fe»fc»^x and *fr*M be final and immediately enforced 
byhim.. » * 
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10-3-1012.5. Appeal to district court — Scope of 
review. 
Any final action or order of the commission may be 
appealed to the Court of Appeals for review. The no-
tice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the 
issuance of the final action or order of the commis-
sion. The review by Court of Appeals shall be on the 
record of the commission and shall be for the purpose 
of determining if the commission has abused its dis-
cretion or exceeded its authority. iwi 
10-3-1013. Annual and special reports by com-
mission. 
The civil service commission shall in December of 
each year make an annual report to the board of city 
commissioners and shall make as many special re-
ports as the board of city commissioners shall re-
quest. 1977 
PART 11 
PERSONNEL RULES AND BENEFITS 
10-3-1101, 10-3-1102. Repealed. 1983 
10-3-1103. Sickness, disability and death bene-
fits. 
(1) The governing body of each municipality may 
maintain as to all elective or appointive officers and 
employees, including heads of departments, a system 
for the payment of health, dental, hospital, medical, 
disability and death benefits to be financed and ad-
ministered in a manner and payable upon the terms 
and conditions as the governing body of the munici-
pality may by ordinance or resolution prescribe. 
(2) The governing bodies of the municipalities may 
create and administer personnel benefit programs 
separately or jointly with other municipalities or 
other political subdivisions of the State of Utah or 
associations thereof. 1977 
LO-3-1104. Library personnel — Monthly w a g e 
deduct ions and matching s u m s — Time 
of inclusion. 
(1) The librarians, assistants and employees of any 
lublic library may, at the discretion of the board of 
irectors of the library, be included within and partic-
pate in the pension, retirement, sickness, disability 
nd death benefit system established under Section 
0-3-1103. In the event the librarian, assistants and 
mployees of the municipality are included within 
nd participate in the system, there shall be deducted 
om the monthly wage or salary of the librarian, 
jsistants and employees and paid into the system, a 
ircentage of their wage or salary equal to the per-
ntage of the monthly wage or salary of other em-
oyees of the municipality which is paid into the 
stem. Also there shall be paid monthly into the 
stem from the funds of the library a further sum 
ual to the total amount deducted monthly from the 
ige or salary of the librarian, assistants and em-
>yees and paid into the retirement system. 
2) Where the election by the board of directors of 
y library for inclusion of its librarian, assistants 
i employees within the system of any municipality 
lubsequent to the establishment of the system, the 
lusion may begin as of the date of the establish-
nt of the system or as of the date of the election as 
11 be determined bv the hm**** *f Aii~>~+~<— T* -- * 
ing sums, a sum equal to the aggregate of month]? 
payroll deductions and matching sums that woujj; 
have accrued during the period beginning with ti* 
establishment of the system and ending with the elec-
tion had the librarian, assistants and employees been 
included within the system from its establishment 
wn 
10-3-1105. Appointive officers and employees -
Duration and termination of term of 
office. 
All appointive officers and employees of municipal-
ities, other than members of the police department*. 
fire departments, heads of departments, and superin-
tendents, shall hold their employment without limi-
tation of time, being subject to discharge or dismissal 
only as hereinafter provided. ir: 
10-3-1106. Discharge or transfer — Appeals -
Board — Procedure. 
(1) No officer or employee covered by Secuot 
10-3-1105 shall be discharged or transferred to a posi-
tion with less remuneration because of his politics or 
religious belief, or incident to, or through changes. 
either in the elective officers, governing body, or 
heads of departments. In all cases where any officer 
or employee is discharged or transferred from one po-
sition to another for any reason, he shall have the 
right to appeal the discharge or transfer to a board to 
be known as the appeal board which shall consist of 
five members, three of whom shall be chosen by and 
from the appointive officers and employees, and two 
of whom shall be members of the governing body 
(2) The appeal shall be taken by filing written no-
tice of the appeal with the recorder within ten dayi 
after the discharge or transfer. Upon the filing of the 
appeal, the city recorder shall forthwith refer a copy 
of the same to the appeal board. Upon receipt of the 
referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal 
board shall forthwith commence its investigation. 
take and receive evidence and fully hear and deter-
mine the matter which relates to the cause for the 
discharge or transfer. 
(3) The employee shall be entitled to appear in per-
son and to be represented by counsel, to have a public 
hearing, to confront the witness whose testimony is to 
be considered, and to examine the evidence to be con-
sidered by the appeal board. 
(4) In the event the appeal board upholds the dis-
charge or transfer, the officer or employee may ha** 
14 days thereafter to appeal to the governing body 
whose decision shall be final. In the event the appeal 
board does not uphold the discharge or transfer the 
case shall be closed and no further proceedings shall 
be had. 
(5) The decision of the appeal board shall be by 
secret ballot, and shall be certified to the records 
with 15 days from the date the matter is referred » 
i t The board may, in its decision, provide that an 
employee shall receive his salary for the period » 
time during which he is discharged, or any deficiency 
in salary for the period he was transferred to a p<*h 
tion of less remuneration but not to exceed a 15 day 
period. In no case shall the appointive officer or en>-
ployee be discharged or transferred, where an app*** 
is taken, except upon a concurrence of at least a o** 
jority of the membership of the governing body oi & 
municipality. 
(6) In the event that the anneal HA««I A<*>* n* 
APPENDIX "D 
67-20-4 STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
67-20-4. Approval of volunteer. 
A volunteer may not donate any service to an agency unless the volunteer's 
services are approved by the chief executive of that agency or his authorized 
representative, and by the office of personnel having jurisdiction over that 
agency. 
History: L. 1983, ch. 174, § 4. 
Cross-References. — State personnel man-
agement system, Chapter 19 of this title. 
67-20-5. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1986, ch. 136, § 4 repeals 
§ 67-20-5, as enacted by Laws 1983, ch. 174, 
§ 5, concerning; the calculation of benefits. 
CHAPTER 21 
PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES 
Section Section 
67-21-1. Short title. 67-21-6. Civil fine. 
67-21-2. Definitions. 67-21-7. No impairment of employee rights 
67-21-3. Reporting of governmental viola- under collective bargaining 
tions of law — Employer action agreement. 
— Exceptions. 67-21-8. No compensation when participation 
67-21-4. Remedies for employee bringing ac- in public inquiry. 
tion — Proof required. 67-21-9. Notice of contents of this chapter — 
67-21-5. Court orders for violation of chapter. Posting. 
67-21-1. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Utah Protection of Public Employees Act." 
History: C. 1953, 67-2M, enacted by L. the time limit of Utah Const., Art. VU, Sec 8 
1985, ch. 216, § 1. without the governor's signature, or in the case 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1985, ch. 216, $ 2 of a veto, the date of veto override. Approved 
provides that the act shall take effect upon ap- March 19, 1985. 
proval by the governor, or the day following 
67-21-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter 
(1) "Employee* means a person who performs a service for wages or 
other remuneration under a contract of hire, written or oral, express or 
implied, for the state or a political subdivision of the state. 
(2) "Employer" means the state or any political subdivision of the state 
which has one or more employees. Employer includes an agent of an 
employer. 
(3) "Public body" means all of the following: 
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(a) a state officer, employee, agency, department, division, bureau, 
board, commission, council, authority, educational institution, or any 
other body in the executive branch of state government. 
(b) an agency, board, commission, council, institution member, or 
employee of the legislative branch of state government. 
(c) a county, city, town, regional governing body, council, school 
district, special district, or municipal corporation, board, department, 
commission, council, agency, or any member or employee thereof. 
(d) any other body which is created by state or local authority or 
which is primarily funded by or through state or local authority, or 
any member or employee of that body. 
(e) a law enforcement agency or any member or employee of a law 
enforcement agency. 
(f) the judiciary and any member or employee of the judiciary. 
History: C. 1953, 67-21-2, enacted by L. Legislative department, Utah Const., Art. 
1985, ch. 216, § 1. VL 
Cross-References. — Executive depart- State Highway Patrol, Chapter 10 of Title 
ment, Utah Const.. Art. VII. 27. 
Judicial department, Utah Const, Art VIE. State institutions. Title 64. 
67-21-3. Reporting of governmental violations of law — 
Employer action — Exceptions. 
(1) An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise bring a per-
sonal action against an employee affecting in any manner the employee's 
employment, including but not limited to as compensation, terms, benefits, 
conditions, location, rights, immunities, or privileges whenever the employee, 
or a person authorized to act on behalf of the employee, acts in any fashion, 
including verbal, written, broadcast, or other form of communication to report 
the existence of any waste of public funds, property, or manpower, or a viola-
tion of a law, or rule promulgated under the law of this state, a political 
subdivision of this state, or any recognized entity of the United States, unless: 
(a) The employee has not given written notice of, or otherwise formally 
informed the employer of the violation or reasonable suspicion of a viola-
tion, and the employee has allowed the employer sufficient time to take 
appropriate corrective action; or 
(b) The employee has not conformed to reasonable procedures 
administratively established by the employer for reporting such matters 
to the appropriate administrators; or 
(c) The employee knows or has reason to know that the report is mali-
cious, false, or frivolous. 
(2) An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise bring a per-
sonal action against an employee affecting in any manner the employee's 
employment, including but not limited to compensation, terms, benefits, con-
ditions, location, rights, immunities, or privileges whenever a public body 
requests the employee's participation in an investigation, hearing, inquiry, or 
other form of administrative review held by the public body. 
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History: C. 1953, 67-21-3, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Libel, Chapter 2 of 
1986, ch. 216, § 1. Title 45, § 76-9-501 et seq. 
67-21-4. Remedies for employee bringing action — Proof 
required. 
(1) An employee who alleges a violation of this chapter may bring a civil 
action for appropriate injunctive relief or actual damages, or both, within 90 
days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this chapter. 
(2) An action commenced under Subsection (1) may be brought in the cir-
cuit court for the county where the alleged violation occurred, the county 
where the complainant resides, or the county where the person against whom 
the civil complaint is filed resides or has his principal place of business* 
(3) As used in Subsection (1) "damages" means damages for injury or loss 
caused by each violation of this chapter, including reasonable attorney fees. 
(4) An employee shall show by clear and convincing evidence that he or a 
person acting on his behalf was intending to report, verbally or in writing, a 
violation or a suspected violation of a law of this state, a political subdivision 
of this state, or the United States, to a public body. 
History: C. 1953, 67-21-4, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Grounds for injunc-
1985, ch. 216, § 1. tion. Rule 65A, U.R.C.P. 
67-21-5. Court orders for violation of chapter. 
A court, in rendering a judgment in an action brought under this chapter, 
shall order, as the court considers appropriate, reinstatement of the employee 
at the same level, the payment of back wages, full reinstatement of fringe 
benefits and seniority rights, actual damages, or any combination of these 
remedies. A court may also award the complainant all or a portion of the costs 
of litigation, including reasonable attorney fees and witness fees, if the court 
determines that the award is appropriate. 
History: C. 1953, 67-21-5, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Award of attorney 
1985, ch. 216, § 1. fees, § 73-27-56. 
67-21-6. Civil fine. 
(1) A person who violates this chapter is liable for a civil fine of not more 
than $500. 
(2) A civil fine which is ordered under this chapter shall be submitted to the 
state treasurer for deposit in the General Fund. 
History: C. 1953, 67-21-6, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Definition of "Gen-
1985, ch. 216, f 1. erai Fund." § 67-4-2. 
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67-21-7. No impairment of employee rights under collec-
tive bargaining agreement 
This chapter shall not be construed to diminish or impair the rights of an 
employee under any collective bargaining agreement. 
History: C. 1953, 67-21-7, enacted by L. tions and collective bargaining, Chapter 20 of 
1985, ch. 216, § 1. Title 34. 
Cross-References. — Employment reia-
67-21-8. No compensation when participation in public in-
quiry. 
This chapter shall not be construed to require an employer to compensate 
an employee for participation in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry held by 
a public body in accordance with § 67-21-3. 
History: C. 1953, 67-21-S, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 216, § 1. 
67-21-9. Notice of contents of this chapter — Posting. 
An employer shall post notices and use other appropriate means to keep 
employees informed of their protections and obligations under this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 97-21-9, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 216, § L 
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PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 67-19-30 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Eligibility of Public Powers, Politics, and Constitutional Policy, 
Officers and Employees to Serve in the State 1988 Utah L Rev. 295 (1988). 
Legislature: An Essay on Separation of 
67-19-20 to 67-19-25. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1989, ch. 191. § 22 repeals dures for adjudicative proceedings, effective 
former § 67-19-20, as last amended by Laws Apnl 23, 1990. Laws 1989, ch. 191, § 22 re-
1983, ch. 301. § 2 and Laws 1983, ch. 320, peals §§ 67-19-22 to 67-19-24, aa enacted by 
$ 81; and § 67-19-21. as last amended by Laws Laws X979, ch. 139, i$ 28 to 30 and 
1988, ch. 122, § 26, creating the Personnel Re- § 67-19-25. as last amended by Laws 1988, ch. 
view Board and providing for the submission of ioi. § 4 and Laws 1988, ch. 122, § 27, concern-
charges under grievance u d appeals proce- ^ g ^ ^ * ^
 a p p e a i 3 pr0Ceduret effective 
dure effective April 24 1989 Laws 1990 ch.
 A { ^ l 9 8 9 - F o r n t p r o v i a i o n S t ^ 
?3' * 11^1 ^It21*11 ** T ^ b y Chapter 19a of tins title. Laws 1987, ch. 161, § 284, relating to proce- * 
67-19-28. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1989, ch. 191, § 22 repeals § 34, providing for the merger of civil service 
S 67-19-28, as enacted by Laws 1979, ch. 139, systems pnor to January 1, 1980. 
67-19-30. Grievance resolution — Jurisdiction. 
(1) Employees shall comply with the procedural and jurisdictional require-
ments of this section, Chapter 46b, Title 63, Administrative Procedures Act, 
and Chapter 19a, Title 67, Grievance and Appeal Procedures, in seeking reso-
lution of grievances. 
(2) All grievances based upon a claim or charge of injustice or oppression, 
including dismissal from employment, resulting from an act, occurrence, com-
mission, or condition shall be governed by Chapter 19a, Title 67, Grievance 
and Appeal Procedures, and Chapter 46b, Title 63, Administrative Procedures 
Act 
(3) All grievances involving classification or schedule assignment shall be 
governed by Section 67-19-31 and are exempt from the procedures of Chapter 
46b, Title 63, Administrative Procedures Act. 
(4) All grievances by applicants for positions in state government involving 
an alleged discriminatory or prohibited employment practice shall be gov-
erned by Section 67-19-32 and Chapter 46b, Title 63, Administrative Proce-
dures Act 
(5) A "grievance" under this chapter is a request for agency action for 
purposes of Chapter 46b, Title 63, Administrative Procedures Act 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-30* enacted by L. from the procedures o f in Subsection (3), and 
1989, ch. 191* I 3; 199U ch. 204, § 6. made minor stylistic changes throughout the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- section, 
ment, effective April 29,1991, inserted "Grzev- Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 191 
ance and Appeal rYocedures" following Title became effective on April 24,1989. pursuant to 
67* in Subsections (1) and (2). "are exempt Utah Const, Art. VT, See. 25. 
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67-19-31. Classification or position schedule assignment 
grievances — Procedure-
(1) Upon receipt of a classification or position schedule assignment griev-
ance, the administrator of the Career Service Review Board shall refer the 
grievance to the director. 
(2) (a) The director shall assign the grievance to a classification panel of 
three or more impartial persons trained in 3tate classification procedures. 
(b) The classification panel shall determine whether or not the classifi-
cation assignment was appropriate by applying the statutes, rules, and 
procedures adopted by the department that were in effect at the time of 
the classification or schedule change. 
(c) The classification panel may: 
(i) obtain access to previous audits, classification decisions, and 
reports; 
(ii) request new or additional audits by department or agency per-
sonnel analysts; and 
(iii) consider new or additional information. 
(d) The classification panel may sustain or modify the original decision 
or make a new decision. 
(e) The classification panel shall report its decision and findings to the 
director, who shall notify the grievant. 
(3) (a) Either party may appeal the panel's decision to a classification com-
mittee appointed by the director. 
(b) The director shall appoint a classification committee composed of 
three or more department directors representing both large and small 
agencies to hear the appeal. 
(c) The classification committee shall review the classification and 
make the final decision. 
History: C. 1953, 87-19-31, enacted by L. became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to 
1989, dbu 191, § 4. Utah Consu Art. VI. Sec 25. 
Effective Dates, — Laws 1989, Chapter 191 
67-19-32. Discriminatory/prohibited employment prac-
tices grievances — Procedures, 
(1) An applicant for a position in state government, a probationary em-
ployee, career service employee, or an exempt employee who alleges a discrim-
inatory or prohibited employment practice as defined in Section 34-35-6 may 
submit a written grievance to the department head where the alleged unlaw-
ful act occurred. 
(2) Within ten working days after a written grievance \3 submitted under 
Subsection (1), the department head shall issue a written response to the 
grievance stating his decision ami the reasons for the decision. 
(3) If the department head does not issue a decision within ten days, or if 
the grievant is dissatisfied with the decision, the grievant may submit a 
complaint to the Utah Antidiscrimination Division pursuant to Section 
34-35-7.L 
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PART 2 
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
67-19a-201. Career Service Review Board created — Mem-
bers — Appointment — Removal — Terms — Or-
ganization — Compensation. 
(1) There is created a Career Service Review Board. 
(2) (a) The governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall ap-
point five members to the board no more than three of which are members 
of the same political party. 
(b) The governor shall appoint members whose gender and ethnicity 
represent the career service work force. 
(c) The governor may remove any board member for cause and appoint 
a replacement to complete the unexpired term of the member removed for 
cause. 
(3) The governor shall ensure that appointees to the board: 
(a) are qualified by knowledge of employee relations and merit system 
principles in public employment; and 
(b) are not: 
(i) members of any local, state, or national committee of a political 
party; 
(ii) officers or members of a committee in any partisan political 
club; and 
(iii) holding or a candidate for a paid public office. 
(4) (a) The governor shall appoint board members to serve four-year terms 
as follows: 
(i) three members shall be appointed to a term beginning and end-
ing with the governor's term; and 
(ii) two members shall be appointed to four-year terms beginning 
January 1 of the third year of the governor's regular term in office. 
(b) The members of the board shall serve until their successors are 
appointed and qualified. 
(c) Persons serving on the board as of the effective date of this act may 
complete the term for which they were appointed. 
(d) If a vacancy occurs on the board, the governor may appoint a new 
person to fill the unexpired term. 
(5) Each year, the board shall choose a chairman and vice-chairman from 
its own members. 
(6) (a) Three members of the board are a quorum for the transaction of 
business. 
(b) Action by a majority of members when a quorum is present is action 
of the board. 
(7) Members of the board shall serve without compensation, but they may 
be reimbursed for expenses incurred in the performance of their official duties 
as established by the Division of Finance. 
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History: C. 1953, 67-19a-201, enacted by became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to 
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 7. Utah Const, Art. VT, Sec 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 191 
67-19a-202. Powers — Jurisdiction. 
(1) (a) The board shall serve as the final administrative body to review 
appeals from career service employees and agencies of decisions about 
promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, 
wages, salary, violations of personnel rules, issues concerning the equita-
ble administration of benefits, reductions in force, and disputes concern-
ing abandonment of position that have not been resolved at an earlier 
stage in the grievance procedure. 
(b) The board has no jurisdiction to review or decide any other person-
nel matters. 
(2) The time limits established in this chapter supersede the procedural 
time limits established in Chapter 46b, Title 63, Administrative Procedures 
Act. 
(3) In conjunction with any inquiry, investigation, hearing, or other pro-
ceeding, any member of the board may: 
(a) administer oaths; 
(b) certify official acts; 
(c) subpoena witnesses, documents, and other evidence; and 
(d) grant continuances pursuant to board rule. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-202, enacted by "employees" in Subsection (l)(a), and "Admin-
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 8; 1991, ch. 101, § 3; 1991, istrative Procedures Act" after "Title S2M in 
ch. 204, § 8. Subsection (2). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- This section is set out as reconciled by the 
mentbych. 101, effective Apnl 29,1991, added office of Legislative Research and General 
Subsection (3)(d), making a related grammati- CounseL 
cal change, and made a chajoge m the style of Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 191 
t h S n d l ? ^ r referefce m ,Subfcto1n0n (2b . became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to 
A ^ oi^laT^^y ^ • ^w V e Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec 25. April 29, 1991, inserted career service before 
67-19a-203- Rulemaking authority. 
The board may make rules governing: 
(1) definitions of terms, phrases, and words used in the grievance pro-
cess established by this chapter; 
(2) what matters constitute excusable neglect for purposes of the 
waiver of time limits established by this chapter, 
(3) the application for and service of subpoenas, the service and filing 
of pleadings, and the issuance of rulings, orders, determinations, sum-
mary judgments, transcripts, and other legal documents necessary in 
grievance proceedings; 
(4) the use, calling, attendance, participation, and fees of witnesses in 
grievance proceedings; 
(5) continuances of grievance proceedings; 
(6) procedures in jurisdictional and evidentiary hearings, unless gov-
erned by Chapter 46b, Title 63, the Administrative Procedures Act; 
(7) the presence of media representatives at grievance proceedings; and 
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(8) procedures for sealing files or making data pertaining to a griev-
ance unavailable to the public. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19*203, enacted by became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to 
L. 1989, ch. 191, 3 9. Utah Const., Arc VT, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 191 
67-19a-204. Administrator — Powers. 
(1) The board shall employ a person with demonstrated ability to adminis-
ter personnel policies to assist it in performing the functions specified in this 
chapter. 
(2) (a) The administrator may: 
(i) assign qualified, impartial hearing officers on a per case basis to 
adjudicate matters under the jurisdiction of the board; 
(ii) subpoena witnesses, documents, and other evidence in conjunc-
tion with any inquiry, investigation, hearing, or other proceeding; 
and 
(iii) upon motion made by a party or person to whom the subpoena 
is directed and upon notice to the party who issued the subpoena, 
quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable, requires an exces-
sive number of witnesses, or requests evidence not relevant to any 
matter in issue, 
(b) In selecting and assigning hearing officers under authority of this 
section, the administrator shall appoint hearing officers that have demon-
strated by education, training, and experience the ability to adjudicate 
and resolve personnel administration disputes by applying employee rela-
tions principles within a large, public work force. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-204, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 191 
L. 1989, en. 191, § 10; 1991, ch. 101, § 4. became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- Utah. Const., Art. VI Sec 25. 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, added Subsec-
tion (2)<aKiii) and made relaxed changes. 
PART 3 
GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL PROCEDURES 
67-19a-301. Charges submissible under grievance and ap-
peals procedure. 
(1) This grievance procedure may only be used by career service employees 
who are not: 
(a) public applicants for a position with the state's work force; 
(b) public employees of the state's political subdivisions; 
(c) public employees covered by other grievance procedures; or 
(d) employees of state institutions of higher education. 
(2) Whenever a question or dispute exists as to whether an employee is 
qualified to use this grievance procedure, the administrator shall resolve the 
question or dispute. The administrator's decision is reviewable only by the 
Court of Appeals. 
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CHAPTER 30 
DEPUTY SHERIFFS — MERIT SYSTEM 
Section Section 
17-30-1. Definitions. 
17-30-2. Appointment of subordinate peace 
officers. 17-30-13. 
17-30-3. Establishment of merit system 17-30-14. 
commission — Appointment. 17-30-15. 
qualifications and compensa- 17-30-16 
tion of members. 
17-30-4. General duty of commission. 17-30-17. 
17-30-O. Organization of commission — 
Secretary — Offices — Job cias- 17-30-18. 
sification plan. 
17-30-6. Preparation, direction and grad-
ing of examinations — Notice. 17-30-19. 
17-30-7. Disqualification of aoolkant for 17-30-20. 
examination — Appeal to com-
mission. 17-30-21. 
17-30-3. Preservation and inspection of ex-
amination papers. 
17-30-9. Preparation and expiration of eli-
gible register. 17-30-22. 
17-30-10. Appointments from eligible regis-
ter — Failure to accept appoint- 17-30-23. 
raent. 
17-30-11. Probationary penod of appoint-
ment. 17-30-24. 
17-30-12. Vacancies — Positions requiring 
special qualifications—Compe-
tition suspended — Promotion 
— Promotional register. 
Transfer of officer. 
Temporary appointment. 
Emergency appointment. 
Temporary layoffs — Re-employ-
ment register. 
Leave of aosence — Sick leaves 
and vacations. 
Demotion, reduction in pay, sus-
pension or discharge — 
Grounds — How made 
Disciplinary procedures. 
Apoeal to district court — Scope 
of review 
Power of commission members to 
administer oaths and subpoena 
witnesses — Rigflts of, and fees 
for. witnesses. 
Prohibitions against political ac-
tivities — Penalties. 
Severability of provisions — Duty 
of commission to provide for un-
specified activities. 
More than one chief deputy in 
larger county departments. 
17-30-1. Definitions. 
(1) "Governing body" means the board of county commissioners. 
(2) "Appointing authority" means the sheriff of a county having jurisdiction 
over any peace officer as hereinafter defined. 
(3) "Peace officer" means any paid deputy sheriff, other than a chief deputy 
designated by the sheriff, who is in the continuous employ of a county. 
(4) "Commission" means the personnel merit system commission consisting 
of three persons appointed by the governing body and having the duty, power 
and responsibility for the discharge of the functions of this act. 
(5) "The state Department of Public Safety" means the Department of Pub-
lic Safety as constituted under Sections 41-13-1 through 41-13-9, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. 
History: Initiative Measure, I960, § L 
adopted Nov. 3, 1960. 
Meaning of "this act." — The term ''this 
act." in Subsection (4). means Initiative Mea-
sure. I960, which appears as §§ 17-30-1 to 
17-30-23. 
Cross-References. — County Personnel 
Management Act, Chapter 33 of this title. 
County shenffc Chapter 22 of this title. 
Peace officer training. Chapter 15 of Title 67. 
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17-30-2. Appointment of subordinate peace officers. 
(1) From and after the effective date of this act the sheriff of each county 
with a population of 20,000 people or more which shall regularly employ one 
or more peace officers shall, by and with the advice and consent of the board of 
county commissioners, and subject to the rules and regulations of the merit 
service commission, appoint from the classified merit service list furnished by 
the merit service commission, all subordinate peace officers in his department 
and in like manner fill all vacancies in the same and shall further promote, 
transfer, demote, suspend or remove peace officers in accordance with the 
provisions of this act. 
(2) Every peace officer who is serving as such upon the effective date of this 
act shall be deemed fully qualified for such position without examination or 
test and deemed to have been appointed and to hold his position and classifica-
tion pursuant to the provisions of this act. 
(3) Counties with a population of less than 20,000 people may implement a 
deputy sheriffs merit system if approved by the board of county commis-
sioners or the people of the county through referendum or initiative. 
History: Initiative Measure, 1960, §2 , means the effective date of Initiative Measure, 
adopted Nov. 8, 1960; L. 1979, ch. 67, § 1. I960, i.e., November 8, 1960. 
Meaning of "this act" — See note under Cross-References. — County Personnel 
same catchline following § 17-30-1. Management Act, Chapter 33 of this title. 
The term "the effective date of this act" 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Provisions mandatory. from ment service list furnished by merit ser-
Provisionsof this section requiring sheriff of vice commission are mandatory. Snyder v. 
county with population of 20,000 people or Cook, 688 P.2d 496 (Utah 1984). 
more to appoint any subordinate peace officers 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Civil Ser-
vice § 1 et seq. 
17-30-3. Establishment of merit system commission — Ap-
pointment, qualifications and compensation of 
members. 
(1) Each of the several counties of the state of Utah with a population of 
20,000 people or more shall establish a merit system commission consisting of 
three members appointed by the governing body in such counties. Not more 
than two members of the commission shall be affiliated with or members of 
the same political party. Of the original appointees, one member shall be 
appointed for a term ending February 1 of the first odd numbered year after 
the date of his appointment, and one each for terms ending two and four years 
thereafter. Upon the expiration of any of said terms a successor shall be 
appointed for a full term of six years. Appointment to fill a vacancy resulting 
other than from expiration of term shall be for the unexpired portion of the 
term only. Any governing body charged by this act with the appointment of a 
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personnel merit system commission shall make such appointments within 
ninety days after the effective date of this act. 
(2) Members of a commission shall be citizens of the state, shall have been 
residents of the area embraced by the governmental unit from which ap-
pointed not less than five years next preceding the date of appointment and 
shall hold no other office or employment under the governmental unit for 
which appointed. 
(3) Members of a commission shall receive no compensation for their ser-
vices, but shall be reimbursed for necessary expenses incurred in the perfor-
mance of their duties. 
History* Initiative Measure, 1980, § 3, Meaning of "this act." — See note under 
adopted Nov. 8, I960; L. 1979, en. 67, § 2. same catchline following § 17-30-2. 
17-30-4- General duty of commission-
The commission shall be responsible for carrying out the provisions of this 
act, and shall make all necessary rules and regulations, not in conflict with 
the provisions hereof, as may be necessary for that purpose. 
History: Initiative Measure, 1960, § 4, Cross-References. — Administrative rule* 
adopted Nov. 3, 1960. making, Chapter 46a of Title 63. 
Meaning of "this act" — See note under 
same catchline following § 17-30-1. 
17-30-5. Organization of commission — Secretary — Of-
fices — Job classification plan. 
Each merit system commission shall be organized by its members who shall 
select one member as chairman and shall have assigned to it by the governing 
body of the county, a qualified employee of the county to act as secretary. Such 
employee shall be acceptable to the commission and shall act and serve as 
secretary without additional compensation unless the governing body of the 
county so specifies. The county governing body shall provide suitable accom-
modations, supplies and equipment as needed to enable the commission to 
attend to its business. The commission shall formulate a comprehensive job 
classification plan covering all peace officers of the governmental unit. The 
plan shall place all positions requiring substantially the same duties and 
qualifications in the same classification and shall include minimum physical 
and educational qualifications of the applicants for each position, and provide 
standards for promotion. The commission shall adopt a classification plan 
which shall be the basis of the administration of this act until changed with 
the approval of the commission. In the event a new position is created and 
approved by the governing body, such position shall automatically be classi-
fied and become a part of the classification plan. 
History: Initiative Measure, I960, § 5, Meaning of "this act." — See note under 
adopted Nov. 8, 1960. same catchline following § 17-30-i. 
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17-30-8. Preservation and inspection of examination pa-
pers. 
All examination papers shall remain the property of the commission, and 
shall be preserved until the expiration of the eligible register for the prepara-
tion of which an examination is given. Examination papers shall not be open 
to public inspection without court order, but an applicant may inspect his own 
papers at any time within thirty days after the mailing of notice of his grade. 
The appointing authority may inspect the papers of any eligible applicant 
certified for appointment. 
History: Initiative Measure, I960, $ 8, Cross-References. — Access to public 
adopted Nov. 8, i960. records, § 63-2-66. 
Inspection of public writings, § 78-26-2. 
17-30-9. Preparation and expiration of eligible register. 
(1) Upon completion of an examination the commission shall prepare an 
eligible register containing the names of all persons receiving a passing grade 
in the order of grades earned, beginning with the highest. 
(2) An eligible register shall expire not later than two years after the date 
of the examination unless the commission, for good reason, shall extend the 
time not to exceed one additional year. The promulgation of a new eligible 
register shall automatically cancel all previous registers for the same class or 
position. 
History: Initiative Measure, I960, § 9, 
adopted Nov. 8, 1960. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Public inspection. and 78-26-2. Deputy Sheriffs Mut. Aid Ass'n v. 
The "eligible register" is a public record sub- Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriffs Merit Sys. 
ject to public inspection pursuant to §§ 78-26-1 Comm'n, 24 Utah 2d 110, 466 P 2d 836 (1970). 
17-30-10. Appointments from eligible register — Failure to 
accept appointment 
(1) When a peace officer is to be appointed, the appointing authority shall 
request the merit system commission to certify three eligible applicants for 
the position. The commission shall thereupon certify to the appointing author-
ity the names of the three applicants standing highest on the eligible register. 
The appointing authority shall select and appoint one of the persons so certi-
fied. 
(2) In the event a certified person fails to accept a proffered appointment, he 
may, at his request, retain his place on the eligible register if he submits in 
writing reasons sufficient to the judgment of the commission to justify such 
failure. 
History: Initiative Measure, I960, § 10, 
adopted Nov. 8, 1960. 
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17-30-11. Probationary period of appointment. 
Any officer appointed as provided in Section 17-30-10 shall serve a proba-
tionary period of six consecutive months, during which time he may be dis-
charged by the appointing authority. The probationary period shall be ex-
tended for an officer who has not yet satisfactorily completed an approved 
peace officer training program and received a certificate attesting thereto, as 
required under Chapter 15 of Title 67. A person removed during his proba-
tionary period shall not be replaced on the eligible register without passing 
another regular examination. Continuance in his position after the expiration 
of the probationary period shall constitute permanent appointment. Service 
under a temporary or emergency appointment shall not be considered as part 
of the probationary period. 
History: Initiative Measure, 1960, § 11, 
adopted Nov. 8, I960; L. 1983, ch. 210, § 1. 
17-30-12, Vacancies — Positions requiring special qualifi-
cations — Competition suspended — Promotion 
— Promotional register. 
(1) In case of vacancy in a position requiring peculiar and exceptional qual-
ifications of a scientific, professional or expert character, upon satisfactory 
evidence that competition is impracticable and that the position can best be 
filled by the selection of some designated person of recognized attainments the 
board may, after public hearing and by the affirmative vote of all members 
suspend competition, and all such cases of suspension shall be reported to-
gether with the reason therefor, in the annual reports of the commission. 
(2) Vacancies occurring in the merit system classification of any county 
shall be filled by promotion in so far as possible. A promotion shall be made 
only after an open competitive examination, admission to which shall be lim-
ited to merit system oflScers. Such examination shall include an average of 
service ratings for the next preceding year, a rating of seniority, and test the 
competence of the peace officer to perform the duties required in the position 
for which application is made. The combined weights of service rating and 
seniority shall be not more than forty per cent of the whole examination. 
Succeeding vacancies shall also be filled by promotion until the lowest grade 
is reached, which grade shall then be filled from the eligible list as herein set 
forth. 
(3) After a promotional examination, the commission shall prepare a pro-
motional register which shall take precedence over an eligible register. Certi-
fication therefrom shall be made in the same manner as from an eligible 
register. 
History: Initiative Measure, 1960, } 12, 
adopted Nov. S, 1960. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Promotional register. §§ 78-26-1 and 78-26-2. Deputy Sheriffs Mut. 
« , .. . . Aid Ass'n v. Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriffs 
" H l ^ i • - kr - i Merit Sys. Comm'n, 24 Utah 2d 110, 466 P2d 
The promotional register is a public record «3g (197Q) 
subject to public inspection pursuant to 
17-30-13. Transfer of officer. 
A merit system officer may be transferred, without examination, from one 
position to a similar position in the same class and grade in the same govern-
mental unit. 
History: Initiative Measure, 1960, § 13, 
adopted Nov. 8, 1960. 
17-30-14. Temporary appointment. 
A temporary appointment for a period not exceeding sixty days may be 
made, pending examination, when there is no eligibiefj promotion or re-em-
ployment register in existence. 
History: Initiative Measure, I960, § 14, 
adopted Nov. 8, 1960. 
17-30-15. Emergency appointment 
An emergency appointment may be made for a period not exceeding seven 
days, and with the consent of the commission may be extended one time for an 
additional period of not to exceed seven days, in the event an eligible person is 
not immediately available from the eligible, promotion, or re-employment 
register and the work to be performed is necessary to expedite the public 
business. 
History: Initiative Measure, 1960, § 15, 
adopted Nov. 8, 1960. 
17-30-16. Temporary layoffs — Re-employment register. 
When necessary because of lack of funds or work an officer may, with the 
approval of the commission, be temporarily laid off. Such layoff shall be made 
according to the lowest rating of the officers of the class of position affected, 
calculated upon seniority under a method prescribed by the commission. A 
person serving under temporary or emergency appointment shall be laid off 
before any merit system officer. A merit system officer who is laid off shall be 
placed upon a re-employment register to be re-employed in the inverse order 
in which he is laid off, which register shall take precedence over all eligible 
registers. 
History: Initiative Measure, I960, ! 16, 
adopted Nov. 8, 1960. 
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17-30-17. Leave of absence — Sick leaves and vacations* 
(1) The appointing authority, with the approval of the commission, may 
grant an officer a leave of absence without pay for a period not to exceed one 
year. In the event an officer on leave takes a higher position in police work 
which does not come under the merit system provisions of this act, the leave 
may, with the consent of the commission, be renewed. In the event an officer is 
elected sheriff, or is appointed chief deputy, he shall automatically be placed 
on leave for the period of time he remains sheriff or chief deputy. Upon the 
termination of a leave of absence, the officer shall be returned to his former 
position. 
(2) Sick leaves and vacations with pay shall be as provided by law or ordi-
nance. 
History^ Initiative Measure, 1960, 5 17, Meaning of "this act" — See note under 
adopted Nov. 8, 1960. same catchlme following § 17-30-1. 
17-30-18. Demotion, reduction in pay, suspension or dis-
charge — Grounds — How made. 
(1) A merit system officer holding" a permanent appointment may be de-
moted, reduced in pay, suspended, or discharged for: 
(a) neglect of duty; 
(b) disobedience of a reasonable order; 
(c) misconduct; 
(d) inefficiency, or inability to satisfactorily perform assigned duties; 
(e) any act inimical to the public service. 
(2) No officer shall be suspended for more than thirty days at one time, nor 
more than sixty days in one year. Demotion, reduction in pay, suspension, or 
discharge shall be made upon order of the appointing authority. 
History: Initiative Measure, I960, § 18, 
adopted Nov. 8, I960. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Misconduct sufficient for discharge. vehicle and using it on the truck taken from 
Deputy sheriffs misconduct in improperly the prisoner was sufficient to warrant his dis-
taking a truck and a motorcycle from a pns- charge under this section. In re Jones, 720 P.2d 
oner, submitting falsified reports, and illegally 1355 (Utah 1986). 
removing a license plate from an impounded 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AJLR. — Pre-employment contract as mass drug testing of public employees or per-
ground for discharge of avil service employee sons whose employment is regulated by state, 
having permanent status, 4 AXJUd 488. local, or federal government, 86 AX.R. Fed. 
Validity, under Federal Constitution, of reg- 420. 
ulations, rules, or statutes requiring random or 
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17-30-19. Disciplinary procedures. 
Upon the demotion, reduction in pay, suspension or discharge of a merit 
system officer for any cause set forth in Section 17-30-18, the person ordering 
the demotion, reduction in pay, suspension, or discharge shall file written 
charges with the commission, and shall serve the officer with a copy thereof. 
In the absence of an appeal, copies of such charges shall not be made public 
without the consent of the charged officer. The officer, within ten days after 
service, may appeal in writing to the commission. The commission shall fix a 
time and place for a hearing upon the charges, which shall not be less than 
five nor more than twenty days after appeal is filed, and notice of which shall 
be given to the parties. If the aggrieved officer so desires, the hearing shall be 
public, and the parties may be represented by counsel. After the hearing the 
commission shall make its decision in writing, including therein findings of 
fact, and shall mail a copy to each party. 
History: Initiative Measure, 1960, § 19, Cross-References. — Right to inspect and 
adopted Nov. 8, 1960. copy public writings, § 78-26-2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in In re Jones, 720 P.2d 1356 (Utah 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.LJL — Rights of state and municipal pub-
lic employees in grievance proceedings, 46 
AJLIUth 913. 
17-30-20. Appeal to district court — Scope of review, 
A person aggrieved by an act or failure to act of any merit system commis-
sion under this act may appeal to the district court, if he has exhausted his 
remedies of appeal to the commission. The courts may review questions of law 
and fact and may affirm, set aside, or modify the ruling complained of. 
History: Initiative Measure, I960, § 20, Meaning of "this act.9* — See note under 
adopted Nov. 8, 1960. same catchline following § 17-30-1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Standard of review. 
Aggrieved party. —Supreme Court 
Standard of review. °* aPP6*1 tom &* Judgment of a district 
—Supreme Court. c o u r t actin& M ** appellate court, the Utah 
Supreme Court reviews the underlying admin-
Aggrieved party. istrative decision just as if it had come directly 
An "aggrieved party1' must be both a party to from the administrative agency; this is consis-
the proceeding and one who is prejudiced or tent with the standard of review set forth in 
affected by the order. In re Jones, 720 P.2d this section. In re Jones, 720 P.2d 1356 (Utah 
1356 (Utah 1986). 1986). 
459 
17-30-21 COUNTIES 
17-30-21. Power of commission members to administer 
oaths and subpoena witnesses — Rights of, and 
fees for, witnesses* 
(1) Any member of a commission, in performance of his duties as such, shall 
have power to administer oaths and subpoena witnesses and documents. If a 
person refuses to [or] fails to obey a subpoena issued by a commissioner, the 
district court may, upon application of a commissioner, compel obedience as in 
like cases before the district court. 
(2) Witnesses in proceedings before a commission shall be subject to all the 
rights, privileges, duties and penalties of witnesses in courts of record, and 
shall be paid the same fees, as an expense of the commission. 
History: Initiative Measure, 1960, § 21, Cross-References. — Fees of jurors and 
adopted Nov. 8, I960. witnesses. Chapter 5 of Title 21. 
17-30-22. Prohibitions against political activities — Penal-
ties. 
(1) Any employee of a governmental unit or member of a governing body, or 
appointing authority, or peace officer who shall appoint, promote, transfer, 
demote, suspend, discharge or change the amount of compensation of any 
merit system officer or seek, aid or abet the appointment, promotion, transfer, 
demotion, suspension, discharge or change in the amount of compensation of 
any merit system officer, or promise or threaten to do so, for giving, withhold-
ing, or neglecting to make any contributions or any service for any political 
purpose, or who solicits, directly or indirectly, any such contribution or ser-
vice, from a merit system officer, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. This 
section shall not be deemed to apply to political speeches or use of mass 
communications media for political purposes by persons not merit system 
officers even though merit system officers may be present or within the reach 
of such media unless the purpose and intent thereof is to violate this section 
with direct respect to such officers. 
(2) No merit system officer may engage in any political activity during the 
hours of employment, nor shall any person solicit political contributions from 
merit system officers during hours of employment for political purposes; but 
nothing in this section shall preclude voluntary contributions by a merit sys-
tem officer to the party or candidate of the officer's choice. 
History: Initiative Measure, 1960, § 22, Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
adopted Nov. 8, I960; L. 1983, ch. 66, § 1. meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Eligibility of Public AJ*R. — Validity of statutes restricting po-
Officers and Employees to Serve in the State litical activities of public ofiBcers or employees, 
Legislature: An Essay on Separation of 28 A£JL3d 717. 
Powers, Politics, and Constitutional Policy, 
1988 Utah L Rev. 295 (1988). 
460 
RECREATIONAL, TOURIST AND CONVENTION BUREAUS 17-31-1 
17-30-23. Severability of provisions — Duty of commission 
to provide for unspecified activities. 
If any section or provision of this act is declared unconstitutional or void, 
the fact of such holding shall in no wise affect those sections and provisions 
not held unconstitutional or void and which can be retained in effect without 
the provision declared unconstitutional and void, and it shall be the duty of 
the merit service commission to provide by rule for the operation and fiinc-
tioning of any activity within the purpose and spirit of the act which may be 
or may become necessary and proper and which is not specifically provided 
hereby. 
History: Initiative Measure, 1960, § 23, Meaning of "this act" — See note under 
adopted Nov. 8, 1960. same catchhne following § 17-30-1. 
17-30-24. More than one chief deputy in larger county de-
partments. 
In counties employing more than 100 full time uniformed peace officers, the 
appointing authority, with the consent of the merit commission and the board 
of county commissioners, may appoint more than one chief deputy or under-
sheriff. 
History: C. 1953, § 17-30-24, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 60, § L 
CHAPTER 31 
RECREATIONAL, TOURIST AND 
CONVENTION BUREAUS 
Section 
17-31-1. 
17-31-2. 
17-31-3. 
Repealed. 
Purpose of transient room tax — 
Purchase or lease of facilities — 
Issuance of bonds. 
Reserve fund authorized — Use of 
collected funds. 
Section 
17-31-4. 
17-31-5. 
17-31-6, 
Transient" defined. 
General authority and powers of 
county commissioners. 
17-31-7. Renumbered. 
17-31-1- Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 311,1 6 repeals mote, and finance with transient room taxes 
this section, as last amended by L. 1987, ch. 5, recreational, tourist, and convention bureaus, 
§ 12, authorizing the board to establish, pro- effective July 1, 1990. 
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(b) It is unlawful to erect, construct, reconstruct, alter, or change the 
use of any building or other structure within a county without approval of 
a building permit. 
(c) The county may not issue a building permit unless the plans of and 
for the proposed erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, or use 
fully conform to all regulations then in effect. 
History: C. 1953, 17-27-1002, enacted by 
L. 1991, ch. 235, § 107. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235, 
110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Findings required. 
Injunctions. 
Wrongful denial of use permit. 
Findings required. 
Justification for denial of use permit to 
owner of unzoned land may not be based on 
hearsay and opinion evidence gathered at an 
informal meeting without opportunity to cross-
examine, and without any findings of fact; nor 
may denial be based on the retrospective appli-
cation of an ex post facto zoning ordinance. 
Contracts Funding & Mtg. Exch. v. Maynes, 
527 P.2d 1073 (Utah 1974) (decided under for-
mer chapter). 
Injunctions. 
Under former section, injunctive relief was 
available as an alternative to criminal prose-
cution; a specific showing of irreparable injury 
was not required to obtain injunctive relief 
against a violation of a zoning resolution. Utah 
County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61 (Utah 1981). 
Wrongful denial of use permit 
Zoning ordinance did not apply retrospec-
tively to deny a use permit to the owner of 
unzoned property who did everything required 
of him under the existing laws. Contracts 
Funding & Mortgage Exch. v. Maynes, 527 
P.2d 1073 (Utah 1974) (decided under former 
chapter). 
17-27-1003- Penalties [Effective July 1, 1992]-
Violation of any of the provisions of this chapter or of any ordinances 
adopted under the authority of this chapter are punishable as a class C misde-
meanor upon conviction. 
History: C. 1953, 17-27-1003, enacted by 
L. 1991, ch. 235, § 108. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235, 
§ 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
CHAPTER 28 
FIREMEN'S CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION 
Section 
17-28-1. 
17-28-2. 
Creation and composition of com-
mission — Appointment of 
members — Terms of office. 
Vacancies — Qualifications of 
members — Compensation and 
expenses — Removal from of-
fice. 
Section 
17-28-3. 
17-28-4. 
17-28-5. 
Organization of commission — 
Secretary — Accommodations, 
equipment. 
Duties of secreiary — Records, 
books. 
Appointment of county fire de-
partment personnel. 
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Section 
17-28-6 
17-28-7 
17-28-8 
17-28-9 
17-28-10 
Commission powers and duties — 
Examination, classification and 
certification 
Appointments to fire department 
— Examinations — Eligibility 
— Tests 
Appointments to fire department 
Certification of eligible persons to 
fire department heads — Proba-
tionary appointments 
Filling vacancies — Examina-
tions 
Section 
17-28-11 
17-28-12 
17-28-13 
17-28-14 
Temporary appointments 
Removal from office — Reduction 
in rank or grade — Appeals — 
Hearing and determination — 
Findings 
Remedies of aggrieved person — 
Venue — Answer — Issues and 
determination 
Reports by civil service commis-
sion 
17-28-1- Creation and composition of commission — Ap-
pointment of members — Terms of office-
There is hereby created m each of the counties of this state having and 
maintaining a regularly organized fire department m which there are regu-
larly employed four or more paid firemen as that term is defined m Section 
49-6-3, a county firemen's civil service commission consisting of three mem-
bers to be appointed by the board of county commissioners of each of such 
counties, each of said members to serve for a term of six years except as 
hereinafter provided Upon the effective date of this act, or as soon thereafter 
as may be practicable, the board of county commissioners of each of such 
counties shall appoint one member to hold office for a period of two years, one 
to hold office for a period of four years, and one to hold office for a period of six 
years At the expiration of the term of each of such members so appointed, 
such board of county commissioners shall appoint his successor and successors 
to serve for the successive established terms of six years 
History. L. 1945, ch. 36. § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 19-24a-l. 
"Effective date of this act" — The term 
effective date of this act " as used in this sec-
tion means Mav 8 1945 the effective date of 
L 1945, ch 36 which enacted this chapter 
Compiler's Notes. — Section 49-6-3 re-
ferred to in this section, was repealed by Laws 
1971, ch 110, § 44 For present provisions see 
§ 49-5-103 
Cross-References — Firefighters Retire-
ment Act § 49-5-101 et seq 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15A Am Jur 2d Civil Ser-
vice § 1 et seq 
17-28-2. Vacancies — Qualifications of members — Com-
pensation and expenses — Removal from office. 
Any vacancy occurring on the county firemen's civil service commission 
shall be filled by appointment by the board of county commissioners for the 
unexpired term Not more than two members of any such county firemen's 
civil service commission shall at any one time be affiliated with or a member 
of the same political party, nor shall any one member hold during the term of 
his office any other public office or be a candidate for any other public office 
Each such member shall receive $25 for each meeting of the commission of 
which he is a member, attended by him, and a travel allowance equal to the 
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set state travel allowance per mile from his place of residence to the place of 
meeting both going and coming. Such compensation and allowance shall be a 
charge against the county and paid monthly. In case of misconduct, willful 
neglect or inability to perform the duties of his office, any such member may 
be removed from office by the board of county commissioners upon a majority 
vote of the entire membership, but such member, if he so desires, shall have 
an opportunity to be heard in his own defense. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 36, § 2; C. 1943, 
Supp., 19-24a-2; L. 1975, ch. 28, § 1. 
17-28-3. Organization of commission — Secretary — Ac-
commodations, equipment. 
Each of such county firemen's civil service commissions shall be organized 
by its members by selecting one of its members chairman and shall have 
assigned to it by the board of county commissioners of the county in which it is 
organized, a qualified employee of the county to act as secretary. Such county 
employee shall be acceptable to the county firemen's civil service commission 
and shall act and serve as such secretary without additional compensation. 
The board of county commissioners of such county shall also provide suitable 
accommodations, equipment and necessary funds to enable the county fire-
men's civil service commission of its county to attend properly to its business. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 36, § 3; C. 1943, 
Supp., 19-24a-3. 
17-28-4. Duties of secretary — Records, books. 
The secretary of the county firemen's civil service commission shall keep a 
record of all its meetings and of its work and official acts and shall perform 
such other service as may be required by such civil service commission and 
shall have the custody of the commission's books and records. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 36, § 4; C. 1943, 
Supp., 19-24a-4. 
17-28-5. Appointment of county fire department person-
nel. 
(1) (a) Except for the chief and deputy chief of a county fire department, all 
positions now existing, and positions created in the future, m county fire 
departments shall be filled by persons appointed from a certified civil 
service register. 
(b) The civil service register shall be prepared by the County Fireman's 
Civil Service Commission according to the requirements of this chapter 
and Civil Service Commission regulation. 
(2) (a) The chiefand the deputy chief of any county fire department may be 
appointed from either the classified County Fireman's Civil Service regis-
ter or from qualified applicants outside of the County Civil Service sys-
tem. 
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(b) The positions of chief and deputy chief are exempt from civil service 
status. 
(c) A chief or deputy chief who is appointed from the Fireman's Civil 
Service list shall be returned to the civil service status that he held before 
his appointment after his appointment expires or terminates. 
(3) This section does not apply in counties that have not adopted civil ser-
vice regulations. 
History: C. 1953, 17-28-5, enacted by L. Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating to ap-
1988, ch. 173, § 1. pointments to fire departments, effective April 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1988, 25, 1988 
ch. 173, § 1 repeals and reenacts § 17-28-5, 
17-28-6. Commission powers and duties — Examination, 
classification and certification. 
Each of such county firemen's civil service commissions shall prepare and 
conduct examinations of persons applying for employment in the particular 
county fire departments coming within its jurisdiction, classify persons suc-
cessfully passing such examinations in the order of their ascertained merit 
and prepare a list thereof, make certification of such classifications when 
required, and make, publish and distribute necessary rules and regulations 
relative to such examinations, classifications and certifications and as may be 
proper and desirable in the administration of its duties under this act. 
History- L- 1945, ch. 36, § 6; C. 1943, act/' as used in this section, means L. 1945, ch. 
Supp., 19-24a-6. 36, which enacted §§ 17-28-1 to 17-28-14. 
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this 
17-28-7- Appointments to fire department — Examinations 
— Eligibility — Tests. 
No person shall be appointed to any position or place of employment in any 
fire department coming within the provisions of this act until he shall have 
successfully passed such examination as shall be given by the county fire-
men's civil service commission provided however, any applicant taking such 
examination who is am honorably discharged veteran of the United States 
Army, Navy, Marine Corps or Coast Guard shall be given a preferential rat-
ing over all other persons taking such examination who are not such veterans, 
of five per centum of the grade otherwise received in said examination in 
determining the final grade of such applicant. Such examination shall be 
public, competitive and free and shall be held at such time and place as the 
county firemen's civil service commission shall from time to time determine, 
and shall be for the purpose of determining the qualifications of applicants for 
positions or places of employment. They shall be practical and shall fairly test 
the fitness in every respect of persons examined to discharge the duties of the 
position or place of employment sought and shall include tests of physical 
qualifications and health. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 36, § 7; C. 1943, Meaning of "this act" — See the note un-
Supp., 19-24a-7. der this catchlme following § 17-28-6. 
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17-28-8. Appointments to fire department. 
The head or person in charge of each fire department of counties coming 
within the provision of this act shall, subject to the rules and regulations of 
the county civil service commission, appoint from the county firemen's classi-
fied civil service list, such person or persons as may be required to fill all 
positions or places of employment in such county fire department. 
History: L- 1945, ch. 36, § 8; C. 1943, Meaning of "this act" — See the note un-
Supp., 19-24a-8. der the same catchhne following § 17-28-6. 
17-28-9. Certification of eligible persons to fire depart-
ment heads — Probationary appointments. 
The head of each county fire department shall notify the county firemen's 
civil service commission of all positions to be filled in his department as and 
when the need therefor arises, whereupon the county firemen's civil service 
commission shall, as soon as possible, certify from the classified county fire-
men's civil service list to the head of such fire department the names of three 
times the number of persons necessary to fill such position; provided, that 
such civil service commission shall always certify the persons having the 
highest standing on such civil service list for the position to be filled; and 
provided further, that a less number may be so certified when there is not the 
required number on such civil service list. All persons so certified and not 
appointed shall be restored to their relative position on such civil service list 
and those who have been on the list for two or more years without appoint-
ment shall be removed therefrom and can only be reinstated thereon upon 
regular examination. Such appointments shall be on probation of a character 
and for a period to be prescribed by the county firemen's civil service commis-
sion. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 36, § 9; C. 1943, 
Supp., 19-24a-9. 
17-28-10. Filling vacancies — Examinations. 
Any vacancy occurring in any position or place of employment in any 
county fire department, coming within the provisions of this act, shall be filled 
by an employee of such department having a lesser or inferior position or 
place of employment than that in which the vacancy occurs provided such 
employee submits himself to examination for such position is found upon such 
examination to be possessed of the necessary qualifications and is duly certi-
fied by the county firemen's civil service commission as in this act provided 
for. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 36, § 10; C. 1943, Meaning of "this act" — See the note un-
Supp„ 19-24a-10. der the same catchhne following § 17-28-6. 
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17-28-11. Temporary appointments. 
The head of any county fire department coming within the provisions of this 
act may with the advice and consent of his particular board of county commis-
sioners, appoint to any position or place of employment in his fire department, 
any person for temporaiy work without making such appointment from the 
certified civil service list, provided, however, such appointment shall not be 
longer than one month in the aggregate m the same calendar year. 
History. L. 1945, ch. 36, § 11; C. 1943, Meaning of "this act" — See the note un-
Supp., 19-24a-ll. der the same catchlme following § 17-28-6. 
17-28-12. Removal from office — Reduction in rank or 
grade — Appeals — Hearing and determination 
— Findings. 
Any person holding a position under the provisions of this act may be re-
moved from office or employment or reduced in rank or grade by the head of 
any county fire department for misconduct, incompetency or failure to per-
form the duties of his employment or to properly observe the rules of the office 
or department in which he is employed, but subject to appeal in all cases by 
the aggrieved party to the county firemen's civil service commission. Any 
such person discharged or reduced in rank or grade may, within five days 
after notice to him in writing of the issuance of the order discharging him or 
reducing his rank or grade, appeal from such order to the county firemen's 
civil service commission which shall thereafter, as soon as may be practicable, 
fully hear and determine the matter. Such determination shall be limited to 
affirming, modifying or vacating and setting aside such order. The aggrieved 
party may demand, and in such event shall be granted a public hearing, and 
may appear thereat m person or by counsel or both. The findings and determi-
nation of the county firemen's civil service commission in the matter, after 
such hearing, shall be certified to the head of the county fire department from 
whose order the appeal is taken and notice m writing of such determination 
shall be served upon the person affected thereby. Such determination shall 
forthwith be enforced and followed by the head of such fire department, until 
an appeal is taken to the district court by any person affected thereby. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 36, § 12; C. 1943, Meaning of "this act" — See the note un-
Supp., 19-24a-12. der the same catchlme following $ 17-28-6. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Pre-employment contract as Rights of state and municipal public em-
ground for discharge of civil service employee ployees in grievance proceedings, 46 A.L.R.4th 
having permanent status, 4 A.L.R.3d 488. 913. 
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17-28-13. Remedies of aggrieved person — Venue — An-
swer — Issues and determination. 
Any person discharged or reduced in rank or grade by a determination of 
the county firemen's civil service commission may, within 30 days after notice 
of such ruling, institute an action in the district court of the county at the seat 
of government, or in the county of the aggrieved person's residence, against 
the county firemen's civil service commission in its official capacity, setting 
out his grievance and his right to complain. In its answer the county firemen's 
civil service commission may set out any matter in justification, and the court 
shall determine the issues of both questions of law and fact and may affirm, 
set aside, or modify the ruling complained of. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 36, § 13; C. 1943, 
Supp., 19-24a-13. 
17-28-14. Reports by civil service commission. 
Each county firemen's civil service commission provided for in this act 
shall, in December of each year, make an annual report to its particular board 
of county commissioners and shall make as many special reports as such 
board of county commissioners shall from time to time require. 
History: L. 1945, ch. 36, § 14; C. 1943, 
Supp., 19-24a-14. 
CHAPTER 29 
COUNTY SERVICE AREA ACT 
(Renumbered by Laws 1990, ch. 186, §§ 112 to 142.) 
17-29-1 to 17-29-28. Renumbered. 
Renumbered. — Laws 1990, ch. 186, Section 17-29-19, as last amended by L. 
§§ 112 to 142 renumbered §fc 17-29-1 to 1957, ch. 28, § 19, relating to the mill levy 
17-29-28 as §§ 17A-2-401 to 17A-2-431. limitation on taxes imposed for county im-
Section 17-29-12, as last amended by L. provement districts by county governing body, 
1961, ch. 34, § 1, relating to the filing of an was repealed by Laws 1967, ch. 34, § 21. 
estimate of the cost of extended service, was 
repealed by Laws 1969, ch 44, ^ 18. 
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17-30-23. Severability of provisions — Duty of commission 
to provide for unspecified activities. 
If any section or provision of this act is declared unconstitutional or void, 
the fact of such holding shall in no wise affect those sections and provisions 
not held unconstitutional or void and which can be retained in effect without 
the provision declared unconstitutional and void, and it shall be the duty of 
the merit service commission to provide by rule for the operation and func-
tioning of any activity within the purpose and spirit of the act which may be 
or may become necessary and proper and which is not specifically provided 
hereby. 
History: Initiative Measure, I960, § 23, Meaning of "this act" — See note under 
adopted Nov. 8, 1960. same catchline following § 17-30-1. 
17-30-24. More than one chief deputy in larger county de-
partments. 
In counties employing more than 100 full time uniformed peace officers, the 
appointing authority, with the consent of the merit commission and the board 
of county commissioners, may appoint more than one chief deputy or under-
sheriff. 
History: C. 1953, § 17-30-24, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 60, § 1. 
CHAPTER 31 
RECREATIONAL, TOURIST AND 
CONVENTION BUREAUS 
Section Section 
17-31-1. Repealed. 17-31-4. "Transient" defined 
17-31-2. Purpose of transient room tax — 17-31-5. General authority and powers of 
Purchase or lease of facilities — county commissioners. 
Issuance of bonds. 17-31-6, 17-31-7. Renumbered. 
17-31-3. Reserve fund authorized — Use of 
collected funds. 
17-31-1. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 311, § 6 repeals mote, and finance with transient room taxes 
this section, as last amended by L 1987, ch. 5, recreational, tourist, and convention bureaus, 
§ 12, authorizing the board to establish, pro- effective July 1, 1990. 
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17-31-2, Purpose of transient room tax — Purchase or 
lease of facilities — Issuance of bonds. 
(1) Any county legislative body may impose the transient room tax pro-
vided for in Section 59-12-301 for the purposes of establishing, financing, and 
promoting recreational, tourist, and convention bureaus, and to acquire, 
lease, construct, furnish, maintain, or operate convention meeting rooms, ex-
hibit halls, visitor information centers, museums, and related facilities, amd to 
acquire or lease land required for or related to these purposes. 
(2) Counties may use not more than V3 of the proceeds of the transient room 
tax provided in Section 59-12-301 to acquire, lease, construct, furnish, main-
tain, or operate convention meeting rooms, exhibit halls, visitor information 
centers, museums, and related facilities, and to acquire or lease land required 
for or related to these purposes. 
(3) (a; The county legislative body may: 
(i) issue bonds or cause bonds to be issued, as permitted by law, to 
pay all or part of any costs incurred for the purposes set forth in 
Subsection (2) that are permitted to be paid from bond proceeds; and 
(ii) use up to V3 of the proceeds of the transient room tax as pro-
vided in Section 59-12-301 to make the annual payment of principal, 
interest, premiums, and necessary reserves for any or the aggregate 
of bonds issued. 
(b) When the proceeds of the transient room tax provided in Section 
59-12-301 are not needed for payment of principal, interest, premiums, 
and reserves on bonds issued as provided in this section, the county legis-
lative body shall use those proceeds as provided in Subsections (1) and (2). 
History: L. 1965, ch. 35, § 3; 1979, ch. 68, 
§ 2; C. 1953, 17-31-3; renumbered by L. 
1987, ch. 5, § 14; 1989, ch. 211, § 1; 1990, ch. 
311, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective February 6, 1987, renumbered 
this section, which formerly appeared as 
§ 17-31-3; m Subsections (1) and (3) substi-
tuted "§ 59-12-301" for "this act", and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation 
*hrou|£iout the section. 
The-J^89 amendment, effective April 24, 
198^/deleted "receiving at least $250,000 an-
nually from proceeds of the transient room tax" 
following "Counties" at the beginning of Sub-
section (2); inserted the subdivision designa-
tions in Subsections (2) and (3); and made nu-
merous other stylistic changes. 
The 1990 amendment, effective July 1,1990, 
in Subsection (1) added "Any county legislative 
body may impose," deleted "may be imposed" 
before "for the purposes," and added the lan-
guage beginning "and to acquire", inserted 
"provided in Section 59-12-301" m Subsections 
(2) and (3)(b); in Subsection (2), deleted subsec-
tion designations (a) and (b), inserted "or oper-
ate," substituted "related facilities" for "other 
facilities associated with the activities of those 
entities," and made stylistic changes, and in 
Subsection (3), substituted "legislative" for 
"governing" in two places, rewrote Subsection 
(a)(i), which had read "issue bonds under the 
provisions of Chapter 14, Title 11, the Utah 
Municipal Bond Act, to pay any costs incurred 
for the purposes set forth in Subsection (2); 
and," substituted "use up to V3 of the proceeds" 
for "pledge the entire proceeds," inserted 
"make" and "annual," and substituted "any or 
the aggregate of bonds issued" for "any of those 
bonds" in Subsection (aXii), and deleted former 
Subsection (b), which read "The county govern-
ing body may not issue bonds under authority 
of this section unless the average annual debt 
service, including provisions for reserves, on 
those bonds and on all outstanding bonds to 
which the transient room tax is pledged is less 
than V3 of the amounts derived from the pro-
ceeds of the transient room tax in the fiscal 
year of the county before the date of issuance of 
those bonds," redesignating former Subsection 
(c) as (b). 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1987, ch. 5, § 13 
renumbered the former provisions of this sec-
tion, which now appear as § 59-12-301. 
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
ch 5, § 41 provides: 'This act has retrospective 
operation to January 1, 1987." 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Constitutionality. 
Transients are not denied due process of law 
by the tax authorized by this section, because 
the tax is not imposed on the transients but 
upon the owners or operators of public accom-
modations Menlove v Salt Lake County, 18 
Utah 2d 203, 418 P2d 227 (1966) 
The tax authorized by this section is an occu-
pation tax, and since the constitutional re-
quirement of equality and uniformity of taxa-
tion does not apply to an occupation tax the 
owners and operators of public accommoda-
tions upon whom the tax is levied are not 
thereby denied equal protection of the laws 
Menlove v Salt Lake County 18 Utah 2d 203^ 
418 P.2d 227 (1966) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 43A C J S Innkeepers §§ 8, 9 
A.L.R. — Tax on hotel-motel room occu-
pancy, 58 A L R 4 t h 274 
Key Numbers. — Innkeepers 
17-31-3. Reserve fund authorized 
funds. 
Use of collected 
The Board of County Commissioners may create a reserve fund and any 
funds collected but not expended during any fiscal year shall not revert to the 
general fund of the governing bodies but shall be retained m a special fund to 
be used in accordance with Sections 17-31-1 through 17-31-5. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 35, § 4; C. 1953, 
17-31-4; renumbered by L 1987, ch. 5, § 15. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective February 6, 1987 renumbered 
this section, which formerly appeared as 
* 17-31-4, substituted "Sections 17-31-1 
through 17-31-5" for "this act", and made 
minor changes in phraseology 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1987, ch 5 & 14 
renumbered the former provisions of this sec-
tion, which now appear as ^ 17-31-2 
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987 
ch 5, § 41 provides "This act has retrospective 
operation to January 1, 1987 " 
17-31-4. "Transient" defined. 
For the purpose of Sections 17-31-1 through 17-31-5 "transient" means any 
person who occupies any suite, room, or rooms m a motel, hotel, motor court, 
inn, or similar public accommodation for fewer than 30 consecutive days. 
History: L. 1965. ch. 35, § 5; C. 1953, Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1987, ch 5, § 15 
17-31-5; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 5, § 16. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective February 6, 1987, renumbered 
this section, which formerly appeared as 
* 17-31-5, substituted "Sections 17-31-1 
through 17-31-5" for "this act", and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctua-
tion. 
renumbered the former provisions of this sec-
tion, whicn now appear as § 17-31-3 
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
ch 5, § 41 provides "This act has retrospective 
operation to January 1, 1987 " 
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17-31-5. General authority and powers of county commis-
sioners. 
The Board of County Commissioners may do and perform any and all other 
acts and things necessary, convenient, desirable, or appropriate to carry out 
the provisions of Sections 17-31-1 through 17-31-5. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 35, § 7; C. 1953, Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1987, ch. 5, § 16 
17-31-7; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 5, § 18. renumbered the former provisions of this sec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- tl°n> which now appear as § 17-31-4. 
ment, effective February 6, 1987, renumbered Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
this section, which formerly appeared as ch- 5» § 4 1 provides: "This act has retrospective 
§ 17-31-7, substituted "Sections 17-31-1 operation to January 1, 1987w 
through 17-31-5" for "this act", and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctua-
tion. 
17-31-6, 17-31-7. Renumbered. 
Renumbered. — Sections 17-31-6 and 17-31-5, respectively, by Laws 1987, ch. 5, 
17-31-7 were renumbered as §§ 59-12-302 and §§ 17 and 18 
CHAPTER 32 
BAIL COMMISSIONERS 
Section Section 
17-32-1. Powers and duties of bail commis- 17-32-3. Term of bail commissioners — No 
sioners additional compensation — 
17-32-2. Collection of fines by bail commis- Bond and oath 
sioners — Disposition 17-32-4. Oaths and bonds to be filed. 
17-32-1. Powers and duties of bail commissioners. 
(1) The chairman of the board of county commissioners with the consent of 
a majority of the county commissioners may appoint one or more responsible 
and discreet members of the sheriffs department of the county as a bail com-
missioner. 
(2) A bail commissioner shall have authority to fix and receive bail for 
persons arrested in the county for misdemeanors under the laws of the state, 
or for a violation of any of the county ordinances in accordance with the 
uniform bail schedule adopted by the Judicial Council or a reasonable bail for 
county ordinances not contained in the schedule. 
(3) Any person who has been ordered by a bail commissioner to give bail 
may deposit the amount with the bail commissioner: 
(a) in money, by cash, certified or cashier's check, personal check with 
check guarantee card, money order, or credit card, if the bail commis-
sioner has chosen to establish any of those options; or 
(b) by a bond issued by a bail bond surety qualified under the rules of 
the Judicial Council. 
(4) Any money or bond collected by a bail commissioner shall be delivered 
to the appropriate court within three days of receipt of the money or bond. 
(5) The court may review the amount of bail ordered by a bail commissioner 
and may modify the amount of bail required for good cause. 
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MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 10-3-913 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J S. — 82 C J S. Municipal Corporations Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations 
* 552. *• 176. 
10-3-912. Chief of department may suspend subordinates. 
The chief of each department may at any time suspend any subordinate 
officers, member, employee or agent employed therein when in his judgment 
the good of the 3ervice demands it, for a period of time not exceeding 15 days, 
and during the time of suspension the person suspended shall not be entitled 
to any salary or compensation whatsoever 
History: C. 1953, 10*3-912, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 48, § 3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Appeals. 
Resignation. 
Appeals. oartment was not shown to have been ootained 
Under this section, there is no right of ap- by duress consisting of alleged threats of the 
oeal trom order of suspension of otScer by de- chief of the department creating great fear on 
partment. Vetterli v Civil Serv Comm.f 106 part of fireman for the economic welfare of 
Utah 33, 145 P 2d 792 (1944) himself and his tamiiy Fox v Piercey, 119 
Utah 367, 227 P2d 763 (1951) 
Resignation. 
Resignation of a fireman from a cxty Sre de-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 62 C J S Municipal Corporations Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations 
}§ 582, 609 *» L85 et seq. 
10-3-913. Powers and duties of chief of police. 
The chief of police shall, in the discharge of his duties, have the same 
powers, responsibilities as shenifs and constables; he shall suppress riots, 
disturbances and breaches of the peace, and apprehend ail persons committing 
any offense against the laws of the state or the ordinances of the aty He shall 
at all times diligently and faithfully discharge his duties and enforce all 
ordinances and regulations of the city for the preservation of peace, good order 
and the protection of the rights and property of all persons. 
History: C. 1963, 10-3-913, enacted by L. Constable's dunes, generally, § 17-25-1. 
1977, ca. 48, 4 3. Motor Vehicles Act, enforcement by peace of-
Crosa-References. — Chief of police in at- ficers, § 41-1-17. 
ies of the third class and towns. * 10-3-919. Sheriffs duties, generally, § 17-22-2* 
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De facto officer. Assuming that the city marshal was right-
Where the person in possession of a city of- fully holding office, the attempt by the mayor 
See is ac most only a de facto officer, he is sub- to remove him without the concurrence of the 
ject to removal at any time and is not in a council was wholly ineffectual. Henriod v. 
position :o complain of the city council's action Church, 52 Utah 134, 172 P. 701 (1918). 
abolishing office. McAllister v. Swan, 16 Utah 
1, 50 P. 312 (1897). —Who holds power. 
When this section is read in connection with 
Duration of term.
 f o r m e r § 10.6-30 fsee present § 10-3-916), it 
Uty marshals term will not m any event ^ ^
 aeen thaLt ^ 3 a m e a u t horities who 
last beyond the next municipal election even
 h a v e the ?0W9e Qf appointment9 foe mayor and 
though no successor be appointed Taylor v.
 d t y C 0 | m d L h a v e ^ 0f removal. Taylor 
Gunderson, 107 Utah 437,104 P.2d 653 (1944).
 v Gunderson, 107 Utah 437, 154 P.2d 653 
RemovaJL (1944). 
—Council to concur. —Without cause. 
The consent of a majority of the councilmen It is the legislative intent that a city mar-
is necessary under this section. State ex rel. shal in cities of the third class may be removed 
Breeden v. Sheets, 26 Utah 105, 72 P. 334 without cause. Taylor v. Gunderson, 107 Utah 
(1903). 437, 154 P.2d 653 (1944). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Determination as to good faith in abolition of 
Corporations, etc. $ 255. public service or employment subject to civil 
C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
 3ervice or merit system, 87 A.L.R.3d 1165. 
§§ 496 to oOl. oo2, 719.
 K Numbers. — Municipal Corporations JLL
^ 7 Pre-employment conduct as ^
 1 2 4 ( 3 ) 1 4 9 1 5 3 . m 
ground tor discnarge ot civil service employee 
having permanent status, 4 A.L.R.3d 488. 
10-3-1106. D i scharge or transfer — A p p e a l s — B o a r d — 
T% > *i ?^3 Procedure. 
-rrs ?.*** fs*7 
(1) No officer or employee covered by § 10-3-1105 shall be discharged or 
transferred to a position with less remuneration because of his politics or 
religious belief, or incident to, or through changes, either in the elective offi-
cers, governing body, or heads of departments. In all cases where any officer 
or employee is discharged or transferred from one position to another for any 
reason, he shall have the right to appeal the discharge or transfer to a board 
to be known as the appeal board which shall consist of five members, three of 
whom shall be chosen by and from the appointive officers and employees, and 
two of whom shall be members of the governing body. 
(2) The appeal shall be taken by filing written notice of the appeal with the 
recorder within ten days after the discharge or transfer. Upon the filing of the 
appeal, the city recorder shall forthwith refer a copy of the same to the appeal 
board. Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal 
board shall forthwith commence its investigation, take and receive evidence 
and fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause for the 
discharge or transfer. 
(3) The employee shall be entitled to appear in person and to be represented 
by counsel, to have a public hearing, to confront the witness whose testimony 
is to be considered, and to examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal 
board. 
(4) In the event the appeal board upholds the discharge or transfer, the 
officer or employee may have 14 days thereafter to appeal to the governing 
140 
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 10-3-1107 
body whose decision shall be final. In the event the appeal board does not 
uphold the discharge or transfer the case shall be closed and no further pro-
ceedings shall be had. 
(5) The decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be 
certified to the recorder with 15 days from the date the matter is referred to it. 
The board may, in its decision, provide that an employee shall receive his 
salary for the penod of time during which he is discharged, or any deficiency 
in salary for the period he was transferred to a position of less remuneration 
but not to exceed a 15 day period. In no case shall the appointive officer or 
employee be discharged or transferred, where an appeal is taken, except upon 
a concurrence of at least a majority of the membership of the governing body 
of the municipality. 
(6) In the event that the appeal board does not uphold the discharge, or 
transfer, the recorder shall certify the decision to the employee affected, and 
also to the head of the department from whose order the appeal was taken. 
The employee shall be paid his salary, commencing with the next working day 
following the certification by the recorder of the appeal board's decision, pro-
vided that the employee, or officer, concerned reports for his assigned duties 
during that next working day. 
(7) The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal board, 
and the designation of their terms of office shall be prescribed by the govern-
ing body of each municipality by ordinance, but the provisions for choosing 
the three members from the appointed officers and employees shall in no way 
restrict a free selection of members by the appointive officers and employees of 
the municipality. 
History: C. 1963, 10-3-U0€, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 48, § 3. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Removal of public officer for misconduct dur-
ing previous term, 42 A.LJL3d 691. 
Determination as to good faith in abolition of 
puoiic service or employment subject to civil 
service or merit system. 37 A.L.R.3d 1165. 
10-3-1107. Cost of living adjustment — Price index used. 
(1) The governing body of each municipality may, in their discretion, adopt 
a plan to allow any person who qualifies under this part to receive a cost of 
living adjustment in their monthly retirement allowance; but the adjustment 
allowed shall be a percentage, not to exceed one hundred per cent, of the sum 
as would restore the full purchasing power of each person's original unmodi-
fied pension allowance as it was in the calendar year in which the retirement 
giving rise to the pension occurred. 
(2) The amount necessary to restore the ftiil purchasing power of the origi-
nal unmodified pension allowance shall be computed from the consumers price 
index published by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal 
Corporations, Etc. § 309 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 32 CJ.S. Municipal Corporations 
§§ 505 to 521. 552, 734 to 744. 
AJLR. — Pre-employment conduct as 
ground for discnarge of civil service employee 
having permanent status, 4 A.L.R.3d 488. 
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The Commission may require or permit amendments to the n o t i c e of 
appeal or s ta tement of charges. The Commission may a l so order 
d e p o s i t i o n s and preservat ion of evidence, subpoena w i tne s se s , and 
r e q u i r e d i s c l o s u r e of intended wi tnesses and evidence as 
neces sa ry for the proper and fu l l hear ing and de t e rmina t ion of 
the matter* 
7 - 5 - 8 . Review of Appeals 
The Commission may conduct reviews of appeals or cause such 
reviews to be conducted in the i r behalf , as they f ind necessary 
to p r o p e r l y hear and determine the i s sues of the appea l . 
Such reviews may include an examination of the procedures used 
and the reasons for the appeal. The Commission may r e q u i r e a l l 
p a r t i e s to d i s c l o s e witnesses intended to appear a t any h e a r i n g . 
The Commission s h a l l reserve the r i g h t to inform both p a r t i e s of 
t he f i nd ings of such reviews. They may a l so r e q u e s t a n e g o t i a t e d 
s e t t l e m e n t i f i t appears that the bes t i n t e r e s t s of the Ci ty and 
the p u b l i c would be served by such a c t i o n . F a i l u r e to a r r i v e a t 
t he reques ted se t t l ement wil l r e s u l t in the f u l l hear ing and 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the appeal by the Commission. 
Not ice of any ex tens ions , amendments, or o the r a c t i o n s s h a l l be 
served by the Commission on both the department Chief and the 
adver se p a r t y or designated lega l counse l . 
7 -5 -0 . HEARINGS - DISCIPLINARY APPEALS 
7 - 6 - 1 . C i v i l Serv ice Commission and Hearing O f f i c e r s -
D i s c i p l i n a r y Actions 
A formal hear ing s h a l l be held whenever an appea l i s made and 
t h e r e i s no negot ia ted set t lement made wi th in t h e t ime s p e c i f i e d 
by the Commission. The hearing may be before t h e Commission, a 
m a j o r i t y of the Commission, or before a Hearing Off ice r appointed 
bv the Commission. 
When the hear ing i s before a Hearing Of f i ce r , t h e Hearing Off ice r 
s h a l l make f ind ings of fact and conclus ions of law.- The Hearing 
Of f i ce r s h a l l make a recommendation to the Commission for t h e 
d i s p o s i t i o n of t he appeal . The Commission s h a l l make the f i n a l 
d e c i s i o n concerning the d i spos i t ion of the a p p e a l . 
7 -6 -2 - Appeal Hearing Officers. - Appointment - D i s c i p l i n a r y 
Act ions 
The Commission may appoint a member of the Commission, o r a 
q u a l i f i e d Hearing Off icer , to hear the appeal whenever in i t s 
judgment i t i s appropr ia te to do so .^ Q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of t h e 
Hearing Of f i ce r a r e a t the d i s c r e t i o n of t h e Commission-
' s -
Payment for the services of the Hearing Officer shall be upon 
authorization of and at a cost determined by the Mayor. 
7-5-3. Conduct of Appeal clearings 
The hearing of any appeal of a disciplinary matter shall be at 
the date, time and place specified by the Commission. The 
parties may appear in person, or may be represented by a member 
of the Utah State Bar. The Commission, or the Hearing Officer, 
shaLl determine at the time of the hearing the procedures to be 
followed. 
7-6-4. Closed Appeal Hearings 
The employee, against whom disciplinary action has been taken, 
has the right to have an open and public hearing of the appeal. 
This right to a public hearing may be waived by the employee. 
The employee may petition the Commission to close the hearing. 
The Commission or Hearing Officer may close the hearing in the 
interest of confidentiality and privacy. In such case, the 
Commission or Hearing Officer shall determine who shall be 
a 1lowed attendance. 
7-6-5. Admissibility of Evidence - Appeal Hearing 
At all hearings, the Commission or the Hearing Officer will 
determine the admissibility of evidence and may -use the rules of 
evidence followed by the Utah State courts if so desired. 
7-6-6. Oath of Witnesses - Appeal Hearings 
Every witness in any appeal hearing shall first be sworn to 
testify truthfully as provided by law. The Commission or Hearing 
Officer may exclude any or all witnesses from the appeals hearing 
prior to giving their testimony. 
7-6-7. Findings and Decision 
When the hearing of any appeal was before a Hearing Officer, the 
final determination shall be made by the Commission from the 
files, records, and abstracts of the testimony introduced at the 
hearing. The findings and recommendations of the Hearing Officer 
shaLl also be reviewed by the Commission with the Commission 
issuing the final decision. 
When the Commission, or a majority of the Commission, acted as 
the Hearing 3oard, or after review of the Hearing Officer's 
findings and recommendations, the Commission shall make and enter 
a final decision in the appeal. "The decision shall be certified 
to the department Chief and it must then be enforced and followed 
by the department Chief. 
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